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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter by virtue 
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
1988), having previously issued a Writ of Certiorari to review 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Svayne v. L.D.S. 
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. DOES UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION? 
2. DOES UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
VIOLATE ART. I, § 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH? 
3. DOES APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS 
GUARANTEES OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS? 
4. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT ERROR BY REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-12 
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE? 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
3. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 24; 
4. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 7; 
5. Constitution of Utah, Art. IV, § 1; 
6. United States Constitution, Amend. XIV; 
7. United States Constitution, Amend. V. 
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T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 
(Utah App. 1988) 17,43,44,45,46 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 
681 P.2d 197 (Utah 1984) 7,12,15,24,28, & 
31,39 
Wilson v. Family Services Division, 
554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976) 35 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 1,2,6,7,16,17, & 
18,32,46 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1,4,5,24,27, & 
1987) 29,31,34,38,42,44,47 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 6,16,17,42, & 
43,45,46 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed 
Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 
45 Ohio State L. Rev. 313, 367 (1984) . . . . 36,37 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and for a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) is unconstitutional, either on its face or as 
applied to the facts of this case. The action was initially 
filed in United States District Court for the District of 
Utah. The Federal Court, Hon. J. Thomas Greene, found 
jurisdiction over the claim but elected to abstain in deference 
to state court consideration. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987). 
This action was then filed in Third District Court 
where the Hon. Homer Wilkinson denied plaintiff's motion for a 
preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment for 
defendants. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's motion for 
injunction pending appeal, expedited briefing and argument, and 
entered its decision affirming the trial court's judgment. 
Steven Swayne is the father of a child born to Penny 
Paxman on June 4, 1987. Mr. Swayne acknowledged his paternity 
prior to the child's birth and his family held a baby shower 
for the mother. Steven was present in the delivery room when 
the baby was born and visited with her each day she was in the 
hospital. After the mother and child were discharged from the 
hospital on June 6, they visited with Mr. Swayne at his 
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apartment on June 8 and June 9 (R. at 203, Vol. I of Transcript 
at 8, 10-11, 15). 
On June 8, Ms. Paxman, at the urging of her parents, 
met with a counselor for L.D.S. Social Services to discuss 
possible adoption. Her parents wanted the child placed for 
adoption because Mr. Swayne is black and Ms. Paxman is white. 
Penny never told Steven she was thinking of placing the child 
for adoption, though in March of 1987 she had said her parents 
wanted her to give up the baby. Steven informed her at that 
time that if she did not want custody of the child she should 
give the baby to him. On June 8, Penny elected to give up the 
child because her parents told her that if she kept the baby 
she could have no further contact with her family (R. at 203, 
Vol. I of Trans, at 10, 13-14, 37). 
Despite her execution of a release of the child, Penny 
was allowed to retain physical custody of the baby on June 8. 
She was told to sign the release on June 8 "so Steven wouldn't 
have an opportunity to file his paternity." (R. at 203, 
Vol. II of Trans, at 7-8). She took the child to Mr. Swayne's 
home on the 9th for a visit. She did not disclose the proposed 
adoption but instead told Steven she and the baby were going to 
take a trip to California. That afternoon she surrendered 
physical custody of the child to L.D.S. Social Services and she 
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went to California. She repeatedly called Mr. Swayne from 
California and pretended she had the baby with her. On 
Saturday, June 13, she told Steven's family the baby had died. 
Mr. Swayne discovered that this was a lie and persuaded 
Ms. Paxman to return to Utah to assist him in regaining custody 
of his daughter. Mr. Swayne filed an acknowledgment of 
paternity on Monday, the 15th of June, and he and Ms. Paxman 
attempted to have the child's birth certificate amended to give 
the child Mr. Swayne's family name. They went to L.D.S. Social 
Services to request that Steven be given the child but were 
informed that it was too late and Mr. Swayne should seek legal 
counsel (R. at 203, Vol. I of Trans, at 15-19). 
Steven Swayne was not aware of his obligation to file 
a notice of paternity to protect his legal rights until he 
spoke with a lawyer on June 13, 1988 (R. at 204, Vol. II of 
Trans, at 11-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
operates so as to deny plaintiff equal protection of the law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. This violation arises from the different 
treatment accorded to mothers and fathers of illegitimate 
children under the statute, which requires the consent of the 
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mother before any adoption can occur but does not require that 
of the father. Where the identity and location of the father 
are known, the statute's gender-based distinction between the 
father and mother cannot be found to be substantially related 
to the achievement of an important governmental objective and, 
therefore, is violative of equal protection. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
denies plaintiff the uniform protection of the law guaranteed 
by Article I, § 24 of the Constitution of Utah by authorizing a 
gender distinction in the rights it purports to accord parents 
of an illegitimate child. As gender classifications are 
expressly prohibited by Article IV, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, the strictest scrutiny must be applied to any 
statutory distinction in the treatment of men and women. There 
is no compelling state interest which justifies the statute's 
sexual discrimination nor any legitimate state purpose which is 
served by the statute's gender distinction. 
3. As applied to the facts of this case, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) operates so as to deny 
plaintiff due process of law in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. This result occurs 
because Mr. Swayne was irrebuttably presumed, under the terms 
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of the statute, to have abandoned his daughter by virtue of his 
failure to file an acknowledgment of paternity prior to the 
time that she was surrendered for adoption by her mother, even 
though Mr. Swayne had in fact not abandoned the child, was 
unaware of any obligation on his part to file the 
acknowledgment to preserve his parental rights and was not 
informed of any intent on the part of the mother to place the 
child for adoption. Under the circumstances of this case, 
termination of Mr. Swayne's parental rights would be 
inconsistent with any notion of fundamental fairness. 
4. Mr. Swayne alleged and demonstrated that he did 
all that was necessary to adopt his daughter by acknowledgment 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 
1987). Accordingly, he was the father of a legitimate child 
and could not, constitutionally, be required to file a notice 
of paternity or suffer forfeiture of his parental rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH'S ADOPTION STATUTES ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) contains an 
express gender-based discrimination. The statute provides that 
a woman who is the parent of an illegitimate child must consent 
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to the adoption of her child while a male parent of an 
illegitimate child is given no equivalent right unless he files 
an acknowledgment of paternity with the Department of Health. 
Given the statute's undeniable gender-based 
discrimination in treatment of men and women, the statute is 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution unless it can be 
established that the discrimination is substantially related to 
the achievement of an important governmental objective which is 
served by drawing the distinction. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976). 
The sex discrimination embodied in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4 does not advance the governmental objective which has 
been repeatedly articulated as the statute's purpose. The 
state interest embodied in that statute is the 
strong interest in speedily identifying 
those persons who will assume the parental 
role over [illegitimate] children, not just 
to assure immediate and continued physical 
care but also to facilitate early and 
uninterrupted bonding of the child to its 
parents. The state must therefore have 
legal means to ascertain within a very short 
time of birth whether the biological parents 
(or either of them) are going to assert 
their constitutional rights and fulfill 
their corresponding responsibilities, or 
whether adoptive parents must be substituted. 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 197, 203 
(Utah 1984) . 
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While there can be little question that this statement 
sets forth a valid state objective, equal protection analysis 
requires a determination of whether the statutory 
classification scheme employed provides a reasonable basis for 
promoting this objective. Although the statute provides a 
method of identifying some fathers who are willing to fulfill 
their parental responsibilities, it in fact defeats its stated 
objective by not requiring any mother to take any action to 
identify herself as a willing parent. This case graphically 
illustrates how the statute can, in certain circumstances, 
frustrate the state's purpose. 
Mr. Swayne, who has expressed his willingness to 
fulfill his responsibilities, was not "identified" as a willing 
parent because the statutory method of identification, filing a 
notice with the registrar of vital statistics, is itself an 
"unreasonable" method of identifying willing fathers. Reason 
would suggest that such fathers can be identified by examining 
their relationship with their child. Ms. Paxman, the child's 
mother, was inaccurately "identified" as a willing parent 
simply because of her sex. Therefore, while the statute 
automatically gave her the rights of a responsible parent, it 
did so in spite of the fact that she was not. 
A statutory provision which operates to differentiate 
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between men and women in a manner which takes parental rights 
away from responsible fathers while fully vesting such rights 
in irresponsible mothers cannot be found to provide a 
reasonable means of speedily identifying willing parents. 
Accordingly, the classification employed violates the 
principles of equal protection. As stated by this Court in 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984): 
[i]f the relationship of the classification 
to the statutory objective is unreasonable 
or fanciful, the discrimination is 
unreasonable. 
693 P.2d at 671. 
The defendants in this action have not, and cannot, 
offer any explanation of how the gender-based discrimination in 
the statute promotes the legitimate state interest of speedily 
identifying willing parents. There simply is none. 
While it has been asserted that the state has a 
special interest in speedily establishing the intentions of the 
father of an illegitimate child, it can't be denied that it has 
an equal interest in speedily establishing those of the 
mother. Yet, the statute does nothing to facilitate this 
goal. Because the statute often only comes into play when the 
mother is expressly abdicating her parental responsibilities, 
the focus of judicial analysis is frequently upon the state's 
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interest in speedily determining if the child can be made 
available for adoption. This raises the question of how the 
state may deal with the parental rights of a father whose 
identity and location may be unknown. While it must be 
acknowledged that the state can legitimately enact measures 
designed to require such fathers to come forward or suffer 
termination of their parental rights, the state may not use the 
problems presented by absent fathers to discriminate against 
identified, present and willing fathers of illegitimate 
children. To do so violates the second portion of the equal 
protection guarantee, that "persons in different circumstances 
should not be treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." Malan v. Lewis, supra at 669. Accordingly, while 
potential problems associated with the rights of fathers of 
illegitimate children may make such fathers an appropriate 
class for distinct legislative treatment, the members of that 
class whose circumstances present none of the problems which 
the statute was designed to meet cannot, constitutionally, be 
treated as though they did. In short, a statute designed to 
provide a means for terminating the parental rights of 
unidentified or unwilling fathers should have no application to 
a known and willing father. 
It must be borne in mind that it is only a legitimate 
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state objective which can justify a legislative 
classification. Therefore, the fact that the statute in 
question functions in a manner which facilitates the adoption 
process, by removing potential obstacles in the adoption of 
illegitimate children by strangers, is no defense to an attack 
on its constitutionality because the state has no valid 
interest in terminating the parental rights of a willing and 
responsible father whose child happens to be illegitimate. See 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
The irrationality of the discrimination employed by 
our statute is graphically demonstrated by reference to the 
facts of this case. On June 8, when the mother, father and 
infant child were all together in the father's apartment, the 
mother's parental rights were fully vested and the father's 
were not. Had the mother left the child with Steven and gone 
to California he could not have effected a termination of her 
parental rights by surrendering the child to L.D.S. Social 
Services. However, on the next day, when they were again all 
together at Steven's apartment, the mother had already 
extinguished Steven's rights by signing her consent form. 
Before she left for California, leaving behind her natural 
daughter, Ms. Paxman had been able to terminate Steven's rights 
even though he was willing to stay and care for the child. 
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In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, supra, 
this Court suggested there are reasonable bases for the 
statute's classifications (between unwed mothers and fathers 
and between fathers who file and those who do not), yet neither 
in that opinion nor any other has any court been able to 
articulate any such basis. What must ultimately be recognized 
is that Utah's adoption law attempts to deal with the problems 
of unknown fathers with far too broad of a brush. It accords 
mothers with too much protection, it accords fathers who file 
their notice with too much protection and it leaves the rights 
of some fit and willing fathers totally at the mercy of the 
mother. It is improper to vest such power in the mother alone. 
The actions of both parents after the birth 
of their child determine their ability to 
accept parental responsibility. An unwed 
mother may have no more desire to conceive 
or knowledge of the conception than the 
unwed father. Nevertheless she is given a 
choice to keep or relinquish the child 
because she gave birth. Her decision to 
release the child for adoption should not 
deprive the father of a meaningful 
opportunity to retain and develop his 
relationship. 
In re Baby Girl M, 688 P.2d 918, 925 (Cal. 1984). 
The simple fact is that under the Utah statutory 
scheme an indifferent and unfit mother has the absolute right 
to prevent the adoption of her child until her parental rights 
have been terminated by judicial decree, while a caring and 
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father who is willing to establish a true parental relationship 
can see his rights totally forfeited by virtue of his failure 
to comply with an unknown filing requirement. There is no 
rational justification for this disparity of treatment between 
men and women and it serves no governmental interest to 
discriminate against interested fathers and in favor of 
disinterested mothers. 
Such a statutory scheme was condemned by the United 
States Supreme Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979). In that action the Court struck down a New York 
statute which purported to require an unwed mother to consent 
to an adoption of her child but imposed no such requirement of 
receiving the consent of an unwed father. The Court expressly 
noted that any attempt to justify such a discrimination by 
virtue of the fact that unwed fathers often cannot be located 
or identified or that they often do not accept their parental 
obligations has to be rejected in a case where the father is 
known and willing to act as a father. 
In those cases where the father never has 
come forward to participate in the rearing 
of the child, nothing in the Equal 
Protection Clause precludes the State from 
withholding from him the privilege of 
vetoing the adoption of that child. Indeed, 
under the statute as it now stands the 
surrogate may proceed in the absence of 
consent when the parent whose consent 
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otherwise would be required never has come 
forward or has abandoned the child. But in 
cases such as this, where the father has 
established a substantial relationship with 
the child and has admitted his paternity, a 
State should have no difficulty in 
identifying the father even of children born 
out of wedlock. Thus, no showing has been 
made that the different treatment afforded 
unmarried mothers under § 111 bears a 
substantial relationship in the proclaimed 
interest of the State in promoting the 
adoption of illegitimate children. 
In sum, we believe that § 111 is 
another example of "overbroad generaliza-
tions" in gender-based classifications. The 
effect of New York's classification is to 
discriminate against unwed fathers even 
where their identify is known and they have 
manifested a significant paternal interest 
in the child. The facts of this case 
illustrate the harshness of classifying 
unwed fathers as being invariably less 
qualified and entitled than mothers to 
exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate 
of their children. Section 111 both excludes 
some loving fathers from full participation 
in the decision whether their children will 
be adopted and, at the same time, enables 
some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut 
off the paternal rights of fathers. We 
conclude that this undifferentiated 
distinction between unwed mothers and unwed 
fathers, applicable in all circumstances 
where adoption of a child of theirs is at 
issue, does not bear a substantial relation-
ship to the State's asserted interests. 
441 U.S. at 392-93. 
Every argument advanced as a justification for 
treating unwed fathers differently from unwed mothers is 
premised upon the potential differences between how they may 
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deal with the child. However, these justifications are 
entirely absent when an unwed father has publicly acknowledged 
his child and expressed the desire to support the child both 
financially and emotionally. When the purported rationale for 
the differing statutory treatment of men and women is absent, 
the statutory discrimination cannot be constitutionally 
applied. As the Court noted in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983), "these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in 
that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact 
similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the 
child." 463 U.S. at 267. 
The history of the litigation surrounding this statute 
demonstrates by itself the irrationality of the statutory 
discrimination. In this case, in Wells, supra, in Sanchez v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984), in Ellis v. 
Social Services Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1986), and in In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), courts have 
been confronted with actions by fathers who have asserted their 
desire to have custody of their children but have had to do so 
against the factual background that a woman automatically 
identified by the statute as a "willing" parent whose sole 
consent for adoption is required, had expressly disavowed her 
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willingness to function as a parent. 
What must be acknowledged is that the real purpose of 
the statute is not speedy identification of willing parents but 
rather speedy identification of that class of people who the 
law requires to disavow their willingness to act as parents 
prior to any adoption. Drawing this line on the basis of sex 
is wholly impermissible. Nor is it reasonable to say that the 
statutory distinction is based on the mother's automatic 
identification as a biological parent by virtue of the birth 
process, because if the statute's true aim is merely one of 
speedily identifying the biological parents it could not 
operate to exclude those fathers, like Mr. Swayne, who were 
clearly known and identified at the time and place of their 
child's birth. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court rejected an 
Equal Protection argument in Ellis, supra. Plaintiff 
respectfully submits, however, that Ellis was wrongfully 
decided and should be disavowed. 
In Ellis, this Court found that § 78-30-4 didn't 
violate equal protection principles because a different 
statute, § 78-30-12, permitted a father to "adopt by 
acknowledgment." This provision doesn't save the statute for 
two reasons. First, it imposes on a father certain 
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requirements that are not imposed on the mother before his 
parental rights are recognized. This is nothing more than a 
second statutory "undifferentiated distinction" between men and 
women. There is no rational justification for requiring a 
father to "adopt" his own child. If the statute requires the 
father to do more than merely identify himself as such, then it 
imposes a burden on a man which is not imposed on a woman. 
Second, the Court itself expressly held in Ellis that 
whenever the natural mother relinquishes 
custody of the child either to an agency or 
to an individual for purposes of adoption, 
in order to protect his rights under U.C.A. 
1953, 78-30-12, the putative father must 
file a notice of paternity with the Bureau. 
Where he fails timely to act, he "shall be 
barred from thereafter bringing or 
maintaining any action to establish his 
paternity of the child." 
615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, § 78-30-12 offers no protection to 
fathers who don't file even if they have or are trying to 
develop a substantial relationship with their children. The 
Court of Appeals has recognized that such an interpretation of 
§ 78-30-4 would render it unconstitutional and, therefore, has 
"modified" this Court's decision in Ellis by disregarding the 
express statement that a putative father must file a notice to 
preserve his parental rights. See In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
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Even if the Court of Appeals' interpretation is 
adopted by this Court, the additional burden placed upon men 
under the Adoption by Acknowledgement statute cannot be 
justified because there is no statutory requirement that women 
have any "substantial relationship" with their children before 
their parental rights are fully vested. 
Plaintiff readily concedes that a father's failure 
over time to come forward and establish a relationship with his 
child can fully justify a differing treatment between such a 
defaulting father and the mother who retains custody of a 
child. However, there is no constitutionally permissible basis 
for giving all women full parental rights at the moment of 
birth, solely on the basis of their biological relationship 
with their children, and conditioning the father's right upon 
filing a statement of his willingness to serve as a true parent 
in the future, a filing requirement of which the father may be 
wholly unaware. 
The Court of Appeals held in this case that the 
statute wasn't a violation of equal protection because 
if shown to be an unfit or indifferent 
parent on account of cruelty, neglect, or 
desertion of the child, a mother may have 
her parental rights judicially terminated 
and the child put up for adoption without 
her consent pursuant to section 78-30-4(1). 
Her parental rights will be terminated if 
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she is shown to be unwilling to fulfill her 
parental responsibilities. 
Swayne, 761 P.2d at 938. 
This statement actually highlights the statutory 
discrimination between men and women by noting that a mother's 
rights can only be forfeited by the State upon proof of her 
unfitness, while a father's can be forfeited despite his 
fitness and without even providing him a forum in which to 
present proof. 
It is disingenuous to suggest that the statute 
contains no discrimination on the basis of sex. Fathers and 
mothers are accorded different rights under the literal terms 
of the statute and the issue is whether these differences can 
be justified on the basis of their rational relationship to a 
compelling State interest. If such a rational relationship 
cannot be articulated, it should be apparent that it doesn't 
exist. 
It is respectfully submitted that the inability of any 
party or court to ever state why identified and willing fathers 
of illegitimate children are accorded different legal rights 
than mothers of such children should provide a precise focus 
for analysis of the equal protection question. If the basis of 
the gender distinction is, in reality, only the unspoken 
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generalization that mothers are inherently more likely to care 
about the welfare of their children than fathers, then the time 
has come to acknowledge that this type of generalization, no 
matter how strongly it might be believed to be correct as a 
statistical matter, cannot properly form the basis for 
distinctions in treatment of the fundamental rights of men and 
women. The core concept of equal protection of the law, as it 
pertains to gender discrimination, is that legal rights cannot 
be granted or denied on the basis of historically honored 
stereotypes about the differences between men and women. When 
the defendants seek to justify the statute's discrimination 
because of the "profound" (but unidentified) differences 
between mothers and fathers, they are doing no more than 
invoking the very prejudices which constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection under the law are designed to protect 
against. The only real justification offered for Utah's 
statutory discrimination is the unstated but implicit argument 
that women inherently and inevitably care more for babies than 
men and are therefore entitled to greater legal protection in 
their relationship with their children. If this argument was 
made explicitly it could be seen to be the most blatant of 
generalizations, unworthy of judicial validation. Yet it is, 
in reality, the only possible justification for the statute's 
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distinction between the rights of the unwed parents when the 
father is known and identified. 
POINT II. 
UTAH'S CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE GRANT OR DENIAL OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
Like the United States Constitution, the Utah 
Constitution also prohibits enforcement of statutes which treat 
individuals who are similarly situated in a different fashion. 
As expressed by this Court, 
[ajlthough their language is dissimilar, 
these provisions embody the same general 
principles: persons similarly situated 
should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated 
as if their circumstances were the same. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 669. 
Under Utah's Constitution, however, the equal 
protection principles embodied in Art. I, § 24, require the 
utmost scrutiny when analyzing a discrimination predicated on 
gender. This is true because our Constitution expressly 
defines gender as an inherently suspect classification. 
Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution of Utah guarantees that men 
and women shall enjoy equally "all civil, political and 
religious rights and privileges." Of course, parental rights 
are "fundamental to our society." In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 
1375 (Utah 1982) . 
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Given our state's express mandate that civil rights be 
shared equally between the sexes, only a compelling state 
interest could justify a statutory distinction drawn between 
men and women. Nowhere in this action have the defendants or 
any court been able to identify any rational, let alone 
compelling, justification for the difference in the statute's 
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. The only justification 
the defendants have ever asserted is that in the case of 
newborns the law has long recognized that mothers are better 
custodians than fathers. This Court repudiated that 
presumption, both as a matter of constitutional law and as a 
matter of fact, in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
It was noted that the presumption was not only unconstitutional, 
it was simply wrong. 
Even ignoring the constitutional 
infirmities of the maternal preference, the 
rule lacks validity because it is unnecessary 
and perpetuates outdated stereotypes. 
728 P.2d at 120. 
Once this fiction is abandoned, it is transparent that 
the only real difference between unwed mothers and identified 
unwed fathers is their sex. In holding that its state's 
adoption statute was unconstitutionally discriminatory under 
state constitutional law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted 
that once freed from the historical prejudices which previously 
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denied unwed fathers any parental rights, an analysis of 
adoption statutes which treat unwed fathers and mothers 
differently leads to the inescapable conclusion that such 
statutes violate equal protection. 
The only differences between unwed fathers 
and unwed mothers are those based on sex. 
This is an impermissible basis for denying 
unwed fathers rights [under an adoption 
statute]. 
Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1976). 
The real, but often unspoken, impediment to 
intellectually honest analysis of Utah's adoption statute is 
the belief that treating men and women equally would be 
contrary to the best interest of many children whose fathers 
could thereafter irrationally and irresponsibly refuse to 
permit adoptions from which their children might well benefit. 
Even if this is true, it can't be denied that mothers have this 
right under the statute as written. To deny men the same 
rights as women is constitutionally prohibited. The fact that 
to do so may be believed to be in some children's best interest 
is simply an inadequate response to an equal protection 
challenge because the best interests of the child is not, by 
itself, a permissible basis for terminating parental rights. 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
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POINT III. 
AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES OF BOTH 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Although this Court has previously found the 
provisions of the statute to be facially valid under the Due 
Process clauses of both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions, it has recognized that application of the 
statute can violate those provisions under particular 
circumstances. See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Society of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 
717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). Indeed, a recent decision of a 
different panel of the Court of Appeals demonstrates that 
application of the statute to a father who has promptly 
asserted his parental rights when given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so would never be consistent with the 
principles of due process. 
In In the Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 
1987), the Court held that considerations of due process 
prohibited application of the parental rights "forfeiture'' 
provisions of § 78-30-4(3)(c) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) to a father who 
filed his acknowledgment of paternity the very day that he 
learned the mother of his child had petitioned the Court to 
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permit the child to be adopted by another man. In affirming 
the District Court's order dismissing the adoption petition, 
the Court of Appeals noted that the father had failed to file 
his acknowledgment of paternity within the time prescribed by 
the statute but held that this failure did not preclude further 
analysis of the facts to determine if due process required that 
he be treated as though he had complied. 
[A]lthough we have found that respondent 
failed to timely file, we must also examine 
whether the statute was constitutionally 
applied to respondent. The state's interest, 
as represented in the statute, is to allow 
for early adoption of illegitimate children 
and commencement of the bonding process 
between the child and its new adoptive 
parents. Such interest must be balanced 
against the constitutionally protected right 
of an unwed father to maintain and develop a 
parental relationship. In Utah, the Supreme 
Court has declared that under the Utah 
Constitution the parental interest is a 
"fundamental" right to be invaded only to the 
extent necessary to promote a "compelling" 
state interest. 
740 P.2d at 296. 
After noting the short delay involved in the father's 
filing, the Court concluded that 
[amplication of the statute to invalidate 
respondent's acknowledgement of paternity 
would impermissibly violate respondent's 
constitutional rights under both the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. 
740 P.2d at 297. 
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This holding is consistent with this Court's position 
as expressed in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 
(Utah 1986), wherein it was stated that 
where a father does not know of the need to 
protect his rights, there is no "reasonable 
opportunity" to assert or protect parental 
rights. In such a case, the operation of 
the statute fails to achieve the desired 
balance and raises serious due process 
concerns. 
717 P.2d at 691. 
In that case, the father filed his acknowledgment of 
paternity two days after the mother surrendered the child for 
adoption, but one day after he learned of the proposed 
adoption. This Court concluded that his filing must be given 
effect because he had shown 
that the termination of the parental rights 
was contrary to basic notions of due process, 
and that he came forward within a reasonable 
time after the baby's birth, [such that] he 
should be deemed to have complied with the 
statute. 
717 P.2d at 691. 
In this action, Mr. Swayne filed his acknowledgment on 
the first day it was possible to do so after learning that his 
child had been surrendered for adoption by her mother. He had 
received no prior notice of the mother's intent to take this 
action, despite having been with the mother and child each day 
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but one of the child's life prior to her release by the 
mother. Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that 
Mr. Swayne was provided a "reasonable opportunity" to assert 
his rights in a manner consistent with the demands of due 
process. Accordingly, the purported waiver of his rights set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(c) cannot be 
constitutionally applied in this case and he should be found by 
this Court to have all the rights and duties of a natural 
father who has acknowledged paternity, including the right to 
custody of his infant daughter. 
The reason that the statute cannot be applied 
constitutionally in this case is very simple: the statute does 
not provide an unwed father with adequate protection to insure 
that he has a reasonable opportunity to develop his 
constitutionally protected relationship with his child. This 
so-called "opportunity interest" of an unwed father is one 
expressly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and one which was recently 
defined by the Georgia Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl Eason, 
358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987). The Georgia Court noted that 
it is an interest which an unwed father has 
a right to pursue through his commitment to 
becoming a father in a true relational sense 
as well as in a biological sense. Absent 
abandonment of his interest, a state may not 
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deny a biological father a reasonable 
opportunity to establish a relationship with 
his child. 
358 S.E.2d at 462. 
The Georgia Court also noted that absent a 
demonstration of unfitness, a 
biological father who pursues his interest 
in order to obtain full custody of his child 
must be allowed to prevail over strangers to 
the child who seek to adopt. 
358 S.E.2d at 463. 
The defendants cannot seriously contend that 
Mr. Swayne in fact abandoned his opportunity interest in his 
baby daughter in the four days following her birth because he 
manifestly did not. He visited her daily, both in the hospital 
and his own home. He invited his family to meet and visit with 
his daughter and he openly and publicly acknowledged his 
paternity. 
There is no question that the natural father of a 
child has a constitutionally protected interest in his parental 
rights relative to his newborn child. See Wells v. Children's 
Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). This Court has 
held that parental rights are fundamental, and as such, can 
only be terminated to the extent necessary to further a 
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compelling state interest. In In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 
1982), this Court concluded that 
the right of a parent not to be deprived of 
parental rights without a showing of unfit-
ness, abandonment or substantial neglect is 
so fundamental to our society and so basic 
to our constitutional order that it ranks 
among those rights referred to in Article I 
§ 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution 
as being retained by the people. 
648 P.2d at 1375. 
While this Court has noted that parental rights cannot 
be constitutionally terminated except upon a judicial finding 
of parental unfitness or abandonment, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) purports to mandate such a 
finding in all cases where the father of an illegitimate child 
hasn't filed an acknowledgment of paternity before his child is 
placed for adoption. The statute creates an irrebuttable 
presumption that a father who files "untimely" has abandoned 
his child. This is the exact form of constitutional infirmity 
in a statute which was condemned by the United States Supreme 
Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where it was 
held that an Illinois statute which conclusively presumed 
fathers of illegitimate children to be unfit parents violated 
due process. In that case, the Court noted that Illinois 
insists on presuming rather than proving 
Stanley's unfitness solely because it is 
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more convenient to presume than prove. 
Under the Due Process Clause that advantage 
is insufficient to justify refusing a father 
a hearing when the issue at stake is the 
dismemberment of his family. 
405 U.S. at 658. 
The Utah statute purports to presume abandonment, 
rather than prove it, by virtue of an omission in filing a 
document. It does not provide for any examination of the 
actual relationship of the father with the child. This fact is 
dramatically demonstrated in this action because it is 
undisputed that the plaintiff had no intent to and did not 
abandon his child. His failure to file a document of which he 
was unaware prior to the happening of an event he had no reason 
to anticipate simply cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence of 
his intent to abandon the child. 
This Court has held that parental rights may be 
terminated for abandonment only "when the evidence is clear and 
convincing." McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 
1981). Abandonment occurs where 
the parent has either expressed an 
intention, or do conducted himself as to 
clearly indicate an intention, to relinquish 
parental rights and reject his parental 
responsibilities to his child. 
628 P.2d at 1288. 
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In In re J, Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983), this 
Court defined abandonment as consisting of 
conduct on the part of the parent which 
implies a conscious disregard of the 
obligations owed by a parent to the child, 
leading to the destruction of the parent-
child relationship. 
664 P.2d at 1159. The Court also noted that the proof required 
to demonstrate abandonment was the same in an adoption case as 
in a termination proceeding. In light of these holdings, it is 
remarkable that § 78-30-4(3) purports not only to remove any 
burden of proving abandonment but to affirmatively preclude all 
evidence demonstrating a lack of abandonment. 
The effect of the statute is to deny an unwed father 
substantive due process by denying him any opportunity to 
contest the presumption of abandonment. "Substantive due 
process concerns the content of the rules specifying when a 
right can be lost or impaired." Wells, supra, at 204. 
While much of the litigation surrounding § 78-30-4(3) 
has focused on the lack of notice accorded unwed fathers, that 
deficiency is of little constitutional significance under 
Utah's statutory scheme for two reasons. First, even if the 
statute provided for notice of the adoption to be given to all 
fathers and allowed them a hearing, the scope of such a hearing 
would be limited to determining whether or not he filed a timely 
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acknowledgment. This is a finding that already occurs even in 
his absence and his presence would not materially assist in 
making that determination. 
Second, there is no question that an absolute right to 
notice of a proceeding wherein parental rights may be 
terminated is not constitutionally required. If it were, the 
most unfit parents could frustrate all efforts to terminate 
their rights by abandoning their children and keeping their 
whereabouts a secret. Accordingly, § 78-30-4 is not facially 
invalid merely because it doesn't require notice to a putative 
father as a condition of adoption. 
The due process deficiency with the statute is that it 
operates to terminate a father's rights as a parent before any 
adjudication of his abandonment occurs and precludes him from 
ever contesting the "finding" of abandonment. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, an irrebuttable 
presumption of this nature violates due process if the fact 
presumed is not the necessary result of the fact determined. 
In Stanley, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute 
which purported to equate a father's status as unmarried with 
the fact of unfitness. 
It may be, as the State insists, that most 
unmarried fathers are unsuitable and 
neglectful parents. It may also be that 
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Stanley is such a parent and that his 
children should be placed in other hands. 
But all unmarried fathers are not in this 
category; some are wholly suited to have 
custody of their children. This much the 
State readily concedes, and nothing in this 
record indicates that Stanley is or has been 
a neglectful father who has not cared for 
his children. Given the opportunity to make 
his case, Stanley may have been seen to be 
deserving of custody of his offspring. Had 
this been so, the State's statutory policy 
would have been furthered by leaving custody 
to him. 
405 U.S. at 654-55. 
The Court expressly rejected the notion that the 
State's asserted need for expeditious determinations regarding 
the child custody could override a parent's constitutionally 
protected interest in relation to his children. 
The establishment of prompt efficacious 
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends 
is a proper state interest worthy of 
cognizance in constitutional adjudication. 
But the Constitution recognizes higher 
values than speed and efficiency. . . 
Procedure by presumption is always 
cheaper and easier than individualized 
determination. But when, as here, the 
procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, when it 
explicitly disdains present realities in 
deference to past formalities, it needlessly 
risks running roughshod over the important 
interests of both parent and child. It 
therefore cannot stand. 
405 U.S. at 656-57. 
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This holding is equally applicable to the present 
action where the statute irrebuttably presumes abandonment when 
that finding would be impossible to make on the real evidence. 
While it has been repeatedly noted that the State of 
Utah has a strong and legitimate interest in identifying and 
placing for adoption those children who are without parents 
willing to provide for them, the State has no interest in 
depriving children of their natural father who is willing to 
fulfill his paternal duties. As expressed by the Court in 
Stanley, the state's legitimate interest can be disserved if a 
statute operates in such a manner as to define certain children 
as needing adoption when they do not. 
[W]e are here not to evaluate the legitimacy 
of state ends, rather, to determine whether 
the means used to achieve those ends are 
constitutionally defensible. What is the 
state interest in separating children from 
fathers without a hearing designed to 
determine whether the father is unfit in a 
particular case? We observe that the State 
registers no gain when it separates children 
from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if 
[the unwed father] is a fit father, the 
State spites its own articulated goals when 
it needlessly separates him from his family. 
405 U.S. at 652-53. 
The due process violation contained in § 78-30-4(3) is 
not its lack of required notice but rather the refusal to allow 
a meaningful hearing to a father who i_s aware of the adoption 
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proceeding. Utah law recognizes that the right to notice and 
the right to be heard are not co-extensive. For example, in 
adoption proceedings a natural grandparent has a right to be 
heard even though he has no right to notice of the proceeding. 
See Wilson v. Family Services Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 
1976). 
It is the statute's attempt to preclude a father from 
establishing his willingness to fulfill his parental duties, 
not its failure to inform him that his rights are under attack, 
which violates due process. This is true because a father who 
has, or is attempting to establish, a true parental 
relationship with his child is bound to discover that his 
parental rights are being questioned or that another man is 
asserting an entitlement to those rights. The issue in this 
case is whether it is constitutional to preclude a father from 
proving that his child is not in need of adoption. 
The inherent constitutional defect in Utah's statute 
is that it does not provide adequate protection for the 
"opportunity" of a biological father, which can be lost 
immediately upon birth of the child, not only without notice 
but without any judicial recourse to assert his entitlement and 
to petition for time to take advantage of this valuable 
opportunity. 
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While Lehr v. Robertson, supra, holds that an unwed 
father can lose this opportunity by the passage of a 
significant period of time wherein he doesn't take advantage of 
his protected status, the Court did not hold or suggest that 
this opportunity could be lost in a matter of days, and lost 
months prior to the time when a petition to adopt the child can 
even be granted. 
It should also be noted that Lehr was a step-parent 
adoption case where the father's rights were terminated only 
because of a finding that the child's best interest would be 
served by allowing her step-father to acquire parental rights. 
It has been suggested that the holding in Lehr in no way 
applies to cases involving adoptions by strangers. 
The time limitation [in which an unmarried 
father must assert his rights] per se applies 
only when another man has independently taken 
on the responsibilities of fatherhood for 
the child and asks the state to validate an 
already existing relationship. If the 
mother of the child consents to the child's 
adoption by strangers, the state still is 
required under the principles of Stanley, 
unaltered by the Lehr opinion, to notify and 
allow participation by a natural fatheriwho, 
like Lehr, has done nothing to evidence 
officially a waiver or loss of his interest 
in the child. Failure to attempt to notify 
a father in this circumstance under a scheme 
like New York's should be unconstitutional 
even after Lehr. 
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and 
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L. Rev. 313, 367 (1984). 
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In short, Lehr is not persuasive authority for 
upholding Utah's unique statutory scheme because it deals with 
a wholly different statute which allows adequate protection of 
an unwed father's "opportunity" interest in establishing a 
parental relationship with his child. Utah's scheme fails to 
reasonably protect this interest and, as such, is violative of 
the most basic notion of fundamental fairness. 
It must be emphasized that the issue in this case is 
whether Utah's statute provided Mr. Swayne with adequate 
safeguards for his constitutionally protected "opportunity 
interest" in establishing a true parental relationship with his 
baby girl. This analysis must be made without consideration 
being given to the perceived interests of the proposed adoptive 
parents, of L.D.S. Social Services, or even of the child 
herself. As noted in Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of 
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State 
L. Rev. 313, 373 (1984), where a biological father who asserts 
his rights promptly is seeking to block a proposed adoption by 
"strangers, the father's opportunity to establish a protected 
relationship must prevail in the absence of his unfitness." 
This Court has held that consideration of a child's 
best interests cannot alone provide the basis for termination 
of parental rights. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
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The question presented in this case, as in all cases of 
termination of a parent's rights, should be whether 
Mr. Swayne's actions warrant a finding of unfitness, 
substantial neglect or abandonment. However, because the 
provisions of § 78-30-4(3) foreclose actual consideration of 
this question, the statute burdens fundamental constitutional 
rights without providing any opportunity for an unwed father to 
establish his fitness or rebut the presumption of abandonment. 
The absurdity of the statute's conclusive presumption 
of abandonment is highlighted by the facts of this case. On 
June 9, 1987, when Mr. Swayne was visiting with his own 
daughter in his own home he had already been "deemed" to have 
abandoned his baby, an infant less than a week old with whom he 
had spent a part of every day of her life save one. A statute 
which can operate to create an abandonment where none exists is 
not consistent with the notions of basic fairness which lie at 
the heart of the concept of due process, and cannot be given 
effect in the circumstances present in this action. 
The Court of Appeals avoided this argument by holding 
that the "statute cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of 
abandonment when parental rights do not exist." 761 P.2d at 
940. This holding, which takes as its premise the lack of any 
parental rights of a natural father until he files a notice of 
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paternity, is manifestly erroneous. As this Court stated in 
Wells, supra, the "relationship between parent and child is 
protected by the federal and state constitutions. These 
protections include the father of an illegitimate child." 681 
P.2d at 202. As this Court further noted in Wells, there are 
three ways in which the parental rights of a father can be 
lost. They can be voluntarily surrendered, they can be lost 
through abandonment or they can be terminated for unfitness or 
substantial neglect. Id. at 202-03. 
Recognition that a natural father of a newborn 
illegitimate child has constitutionally protected rights, be 
they characterized as "inchoate" or "provisional" or as an 
"opportunity interest," requires analysis of the statute's 
method of protecting those rights from arbitrary forfeiture. 
This is where Utah's adoption law runs afoul of the most basic 
notions of fairness. A statute which mandates a finding that a 
father has abandoned an infant child with whom he has had as 
substantial contact as the child's infancy permits, and of whom 
he was actively seeking custody before the baby was two weeks 
old, is an archetype of arbitrary legislation. 
In Wells, this Court emphasized that the State had a 
compelling interest in a "summary determination" of whether a 
child is in need of adoption. Assuming this to be true, can it 
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honestly be said that the State's interest in a summary 
determination outweighs its own interest in an accurate 
determination? The statute's constitutional deficiency isn't 
so much a product of the speed with which a determination is 
made as it is the basis upon which it is made. Using the 
filing of a document as the sole test for the determination of 
a father's willingness and intent to form a true parental 
relationship with his child, as opposed to examining the facts 
of his relationship with the child, is illogical. It is a 
system which is destined to produce speedy determinations which 
are frequently inaccurate. Given the fundamental rights which 
are being determined, a system which isn't even intended to 
make a factually correct determination about a child's need for 
adoption is so inherently arbitrary that it cannot withstand 
appropriate constitutional scrutiny. 
The Court of Appeals' failure to recognize that a 
natural father has constitutionally protected rights in his 
relationship with his child can, to some degree, be explained 
by language of this Court in the Sanchez decision which was 
quoted below. This Court stated in Sanchez that Utah's law was 
not too harsh in requiring unwed fathers "to comply with those 
statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert their 
parental rights. . ." 680 P.2d at 756. It is respectfully 
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submitted that this statement reflects the inaccurate notion 
that a natural father's rights are created by the statute and, 
therefore, limited by its terms. The father's rights stem from 
his biological relationship with his child and the Constitution 
protects those rights from arbitrary attack by the State. No 
matter how strongly the State may desire to make a speedy and 
summary determination of a father's rights, the guarantee of 
due process is a bar to any State action which is so summary as 
to preclude all consideration of a father's true willingness 
and competence to function as a parent. 
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of 
Rights in general, and the Due Process 
Clause in particular, that they were 
designed to protect the fragile values of a 
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing 
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may 
characterize praiseworthy government 
officials no less, and perhaps more, than 
mediocre ones. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656. 
The properly framed issue, therefore, is not whether a 
father has asserted his rights in the manner provided by the 
State, but whether the State has adequately protected the 
father's inherent and fundamental right to exercise his 
constitutionally guaranteed opportunity to form a true parental 
relationship with his daughter. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 249 (1983). 
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In Utah, where a father's opportunity can be lost 
within hours of his child's birth and on the basis of an 
irrebuttable presumption of fact which may well be untrue, how 
can it honestly be said that his fundamental right has been 
accorded adequate protection? Under the facts of this case, 
where Mr. Swayne sought custody of his baby daughter before she 
was two weeks old, can it truly be said that his 
constitutionally protected opportunity to form a true parental 
relationship was adequately protected by Utah's statutory 
scheme? Plaintiff respectfully submits that the answer is no 
and that answer demands a finding by this Court that due 
process mandates that he be accorded such an opportunity. 
POINT IV 
AS STEVEN SWAYNE ADOPTED HIS DAUGHTER BY 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3) 
CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TERMINATION OF HIS 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides 
that the father of an illegitimate child can legitimate the 
child "from the time of its birth" by publicly acknowledging 
his paternity and receiving the child into his family. Steven 
Swayne has satisfied these statutory requirements for his 
daughter and had done so prior to her relinquishment by her 
natural mother. Accordingly, the provisions of Utah Code. Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) should not be applicable to 
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Mr. Swayne because he is not the father of an illegitimate 
child. 
Both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals 
Steven Swayne asserted that he did all that was required to 
adopt his daughter by acknowledgment. He openly acknowledged 
his paternity, was present at birth, visited her in the 
hospital, took the child into his home and family and treated 
her in all ways as his legitimate offspring. Thus, as a 
different panel of the Court of Appeals held in T.R.F. v. 
Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah App. 1988), "any filing of a 
petition for adoption after an unwed father has met the 
statutory requirement, and with only the mother's consent, is a 
legal nullity." The trial court made no finding on this issue, 
however, because Mr. Swayne didn't file an acknowledgment of 
paternity before relinquishment, and, as this Court held, 
unequivocally, in Ellis v. Social Services Dept. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), 
"in order to protect his rights under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-12, 
the putative father must file a notice of paternity with the 
Bureau." 615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added). Obviously, the 
"rights" referred to could only require protection if the 
statutory requirements had already been met, otherwise there 
would be no "rights" to protect under the statute. 
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T.R.F. rejected this holding, however, because it was 
felt that to actually apply the requirement of filing a notice 
would be unconstitutional. 
The language of Ellis need not be read, and 
indeed cannot constitutionally be read, to 
require a putative father to file a notice 
of paternity prior to the filing of the 
petition for adoption in a case such as this 
when the putative father has previously 
acknowledged the child within the meaning of 
the acknowledgement statute. 
760 P.2d at 911. Therefore, in T.R.F., another panel of the 
Court of Appeals noted the very problem in the Ellis reasoning 
which Mr. Swayne has presented throughout this case and simply 
chose to MmodifyM that portion of the opinion which expressly 
required the filing of a notice of paternity before 
relinquishment in every case where the father of the 
illegitimate child sought to protect his parental rights. 
Under the law as announced in T.R.F., before the defendants in 
this case would have been entitled to summary judgment in the 
trial court, they would have had to establish that Mr. Swayne 
had not adopted his daughter by acknowledgment. If he had, 
then T.R.F. expressly holds just what Mr. Swayne has asserted 
continuously in this case, that it would be constitutionally 
impermissible to apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3) to him. 
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In Swayne, the Court of Appeals stated if Man unwed 
father establishes a substantial relationship over a number of 
years" he is protected by § 78-30-12. However, the statute 
requires no such duration for the relationship (which it would 
be manifestly impossible to have with a five-day-old child). 
It only requires "(1) public acknowledgement by the father, 
(2) receipt of the child into the father's family, and (3) 
treatment of the child as legitimate." T.R.F., supra, at 909. 
That panel of the Court acknowledged that this statute, and 
others like it, have always been given liberal construction and 
only require public acknowledgment by the father to his family 
and friends that the child is his, coupled with visits with the 
child in his home or wherever the child resides, no matter how 
brief. The uncontradicted evidence in this case demonstrated 
that Mr. Swayne publicly acknowledged his paternity both before 
and after the child's birth. He informed his family who held a 
baby shower for the mother. He was present at the birth of the 
child in the delivery room where he claimed paternity. He 
visited the child every day it was in the hospital and also in 
his own home. He expressed willingness to take the child if 
the mother chose to relinquish custody. Whether a court finds 
his actions toward the child's mother laudable or not is 
irrelevant. The judgment entered below cannot be sustained 
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consistently with the law as announced in T.R.F., nor can the 
statute be applied constitutionally if the holding of T.R.F. is 
not adopted by this Court. 
In order for the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-12 to provide a means for avoiding the sex 
discrimination inherent in § 78-30-4, that statute must be 
interpreted to only require an unwed father to identify himself 
as such and have some minimal contact with the child which 
establishes his intent to treat the baby as a member of his own 
family. To require more would be to impose a burden upon the 
man not imposed upon the woman and would be inconsistent with 
the equal protection principles cited above. If this is the 
interpretation favored by this Court, so as to save the 
adoption statutes from an Equal Protection challenge, then 
Mr. Swayne should either be found as a matter of law to have 
adopted his daughter by acknowledgment or this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for entry of findings on that issue 
with appropriate guidelines for what must be established to 
demonstrate adoption by acknowledgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's adoption statutes treat the rights of mothers 
and fathers of unwed children differently. They do so 
regardless of the actual situation of the father and without 
offering him any forum in which to establish his intent and 
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willingness to form a true parental relationship with his 
child. The statutory scheme, therefore, deprives an identified 
and willing father of fundamental rights without according him 
equal protection of the law or due process. The only manner in 
which the statute can be saved from these twin infirmities is 
if the adoption by acknowledgment provisions of the statute are 
interpreted in such a flexible manner that any unwed father who 
publicly identifies himself as such and expresses an intent to 
develop a true parental relationship with his child is deemed 
to be the father of a legitimate child with parental rights 
which can only be terminated by proof of his unfitness or 
neglect, or of his abandonment of those rights. 
The appropriate relief in this action, therefore, is 
either a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) is 
unconstitutional, on its face or as applied to the facts of 
this case, or a reversal of the judgment entered below for 
failure to recognize plaintiff's rights under the adoption by 
acknowledgment statute. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
0236d 
032889 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
3. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 24; 
4. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 7; 
5. Constitution of Utah, Art. IV, § 1; 
6. United States Constitution, Amend. XIV; 
7. United States Constitution, Amend. V. 
8. Court of Appeals Decision in Swayne v. L.D.S. 
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988). 
9. Decision of Hon. J. Thomas Greene in Swayne v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 
1987). 
10. Decision of Utah Court of Appeals in a related 
action, In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 
1988). 
78*30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruehy, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and e!l parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has m turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the pov,er to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
(3^  (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics m the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county m this state, 
(b; The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the chile but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed tc provide adoption services or pnor to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption Tne notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child The department of health shall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing m any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it shall be necessary to file with the court pnor to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual sen-ice in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
thall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any Sute deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OT UTAH 
ART. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived nf i;f« i;i • 
process of law. P m ° d ° f I l fe' l l l **y or property without due 
ART. I, § 24 
All laws of a general nature shall hnvc uniform operation. 
ART. TV, § 1 
The rights of eitixens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office 
•hall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and 
female citizens of this Bute shall enjoy equally all civil, political and 
religious right* and privileges. 
9 3 2 Utah 761 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UD.S- SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe 
and Jane Doe, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 880177-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept 15, 1988. 
Unwed father brought suit against 
adoption agency to obtain custody of child 
which unwed mother gave up for adoption. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., dismissed father's 
action, and father appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1) private 
adoption agency was engaged in state ac-
tion upon terminating father's parental 
rights when filing adoption petition; (2) 
requiring unwed father to file acknowledg-
ment of paternity to preclude adoption of 
child, but not requiring mother to file ac-
knowledgment, did not violate equal protec-
tion of the laws; and (3) denial of parental 
rights to unwed father who did not file 
acknowledgment of paternity was not viola-
tion of father's due process rights. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part 
1. Constitutional Law <8=»225.1, 274(5) 
Infants <$=»155 
"State action" was involved when pri-
vate adoption agency placed child for adop-
tion, so as to make Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection applicable to deprivation of alleged 
father's parental rights, where State was 
responsible for statute which deprives 
unwed fathers of parental rights after 
adoption, and where statute involved is 
self-operative and mandates termination of 
unwed father's parental rights upon agen-
cy filing adoption petition. U.C.A.1953,78-
30-4; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Adoption «=>2 
Constitutional Law «=>225.1 
Statute which gives unwed father 
right to consent to child's adoption only if 
he files acknowledgment of paternity indi-
cating willingness and intent to support 
child does not discriminate on basis of gen-
der and violate equal protection clause as 
statute also states that mother may have 
parental rights judicially terminated and 
child put up for adoption without her con-
sent if she is unfit or indifferent parent 
U.CJU953, 78-3<M, 78-30-4(1); U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
3. Infante <*=»155, 156, 157 
Mother may have her parental rights 
judicially terminated and child put up for 
adoption without her consent if shown to 
be unfit or indifferent parent on account of 
cruelty, neglect, or desertion of child. U.C. 
A.1953, 78-30-4(1). 
4. Adoption e=>2 
Constitutional Law €=»225»1 
Statute which allows unwed father to 
acknowledge paternity of child is not made 
illusory by statute which states that father 
loses parental rights upon adoption if no 
acknowledgment has been made, as father 
has right to make acknowledgment prior to 
adoption; and thus there is no denial of 
equal protection in allowing adoption with-
out consent of father who has not filed 
acknowledgment U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4, 
7&-30-12; U.S.OA. ConstAmend. 14. 
5. Infante <*=155 
If unwed father establishes substantial 
relationship over number of years with his 
children, his parental rights cannot be ex-
tinguished without his consent U.C.A. 
1953, 7&-30-12. 
6. Adoption <s=>7.2(3) 
Children Out-of-Wedlock «=>12 
Unwed father may file acknowledg-
ment of parentage even before substantial 
relationship has developed with child to ac-
quire parental rights which unwed mother 
cannot divest, and unwed father then has 
same rights to consent to adoption of child 
as mother. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
SWAYNE v. L-D.S. SOaAL SERVICES 
Cite as 761 ?2d 932 (Utah App. 1988) 
Utah 933 
7. Adoption <&=»7.2(3) 
Constitutional Law <3=>225.1 
Unwed father was not denied equal 
protection when his alleged child was 
placed for' adoption without his consent, 
where father failed to file acknowledgment 
of paternity prior to relinquishment of 
child, father failed to communicate concern 
for an interest in child apart from few 
visits with child, father did not come forth 
after birth of child to assert claim to pater-
nity nor did he agree to support child, 
father denied paternity for major part of 
pregnancy, and father, even after admit-
ting paternity, never indicated to mother or 
anyone else any desire to marry her, to live 
together with her and child, or even to 
personally raise child. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-
4; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
8. Constitutional Law <$=>46<1), 225.1 
In action by father claiming violation 
of equal protection when his alleged child 
was adopted without his consent, court 
would not consider father's argument that 
adoption violated equal protection provi-
sions of State Constitution, after deciding 
that adoption did not violate equal protec-
tion provisions of United States Constitu-
tion, where father did not argue specific 
differences between state constitutional 
provisions and United States constitutional 
provisions. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14; Const Art 1, § 24. 
9. Adoption «=»2 
Constitutional Law <s»274(5) 
Statute precluding unwed father from 
asserting parental rights if father did not 
file acknowledgment of paternity prior to 
mother's relinquishment of child for adop-
tion did not violate due process clause by 
creating irrebuttable presumption of fa-
ther's abandonment of child as father could 
not abandon child until parental rights ex-
isted, and father never filed acknowledg-
ment of paternity or establish substantial 
relationship with child in order to create 
parental rights. Const Art 1, § 7; U.C.A. 
1953, 78-30-4, 78-30-12; U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 14. 
10. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*»12 
Constitutional Law <3=>274(5) 
- Precluding unwed father from assert-
ing parental rights after father fails to file 
acknowledgment of paternity prior to 
mother's relinquishment of child for adop-
tion is contrary to basic notions of due 
process where father comes forward within 
reasonable time after baby's birth, and fa-
ther was not afforded reasonable opportu-
nity to comply with statutory requirement 
of filing acknowledgment of parentage. 
Const Art. 1, § 7; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
11. Adoption <3=»7.2(3) 
Constitutional Law <3=>274(5) 
Precluding unwed father from assert-
ing parental rights after filing of adoption 
petition did not violate due process where 
father did not file acknowledgment of pa-
ternity, father was aware of time and loca-
tion of child's birth, father told mother 
prior to child's birth that father was not 
going to marry her, live with her, or as-
sume financial responsibility for her or for 
baby, father told mother that adoption 
should be mother's decision, father refused 
to sign acknowledgment of paternity on 
child's birth certificate at hospital, and fa-
ther understood system as he had relin-
quished his rights to previous child a year 
earlier; even though mother misled father 
by stating that she had taken child to Cali-
fornia and child died after giving child up 
for adoption. Const Art 1, § 7; U.C.A. 
1953, 78-30-4; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
M. David Eckersley (argued), Prince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler, and Billy L. Walker, 
Jr., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
David M. McConkie, Merrill Nelson (ar-
gued), Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and respondents. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant Steven Swayne appeals an or-
der denying him custody of his illegitimate 
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iild and seeks attorney fees under 42 U.S. 
§ 1988 on the ground that Utah Code 
on. § 78-30-4 (1987) unconstitutionally 
tprived him of his parental rights. We 
verse in part and affirm in part 
Appellant and the mother, P., are the 
iwed parents of the child whose custody 
at issue. Appellant and P. began dating 
id having sexual relations in late 1985. 
While they were dating, P. supported 
)pellant by allowing him to use her car 
id by giving him money for his apartment 
mt and other expenses. During this peri-
1 of time, appellant was also dating and 
stving sexual relations with other women, 
rior to dat ig P., appellant had fathered 
aother child out of wedlock, who was born 
i February 1986. Appellant signed papers 
)nsenting to that child's adoption on Feb-
lary 9, 1986. 
Appellant became aware of the pregnan-
f in October 1986. He initially became 
ngry, denying that the baby was his. 
[owever, in April 1987, he informed mem-
ers of his family that he was the father of 
tie child. His family then held a baby 
hower for P. Appellant also approached 
is sister about raising the child until such 
ime as he became "more stable." 
During the pregnancy, appellant and P. 
esided in Salt Lake County but did not live 
ogether. Prior to the baby's birth, appel-
ant indicated that he did not intend to 
narry anybody, including P., because "it 
lidn't appeal" to him. He suggested to P. 
hat if she decided to keep the baby, she 
:ould live with his mother so long as she 
;upported herself and paid half of the rent 
ie never offered to live with her and the 
>aby as a family unit. However, after P. 
•elinquished the baby, appellant then of-
fered to marry her "on paper" because it 
'would make the baby legitimate." He 
:old P. that they did not have to live togeth-
er and that she would not need to tell her 
parents, but that such an arrangement 
would make their legal case better. 
1. L.D.S. Social Services was licensed during the 
relevant time period by the State of Utah as a 
qualified child placement agency pursuant to 
Utah'Code Ann. § 55-8a-l (1984) (repealed 
1988), but receives no governmental funding 
P. informed appellant in March 1987 that 
her parents wanted her to relinquish the 
baby for adoption. Appellant responded 
that adoption should be P.'s decision, and 
that if she did not want the baby she could 
give it to him. 
In March 1987, P. made an appointment 
with respondent, L.D.S. Social Services,1 to 
discuss placing the baby for adoption, but 
did not keep the appointment because she 
was undecided as to what to do. Although 
she had considered keeping the baby and 
living with appellants mother, she was un-
certain that she would be able to meet the 
financial requirements for that arrange-
ment 
P. gave birth to a daughter on June 4, 
1987. Appellant was present in the deliv-
ery room during the birth and visited with 
P. and the child during the two days they 
were in the hospital. 
Appellant was not present in the hospital 
room when the nurse filled out the birth 
certificate and informed P. that appellant 
had to sign an acknowledgment of paterni-
ty form in front of a notary public to have 
his name entered as the father on the 
baby's birth certificate. When appellant 
later visited P., she had the form in her 
hospital room and informed him that he 
had to sign i t He did not sign i t Conse-
quently, the birth certificate does not indi-
cate the identity of the father. 
Later, appellant denied ever having seer, 
the acknowledgment form, but stated that 
he had told P. he wanted to put his name 
on the birth certificate. He admitted, how-
ever, that he knew he was supposed to sign 
something in the hospital to get his name 
on the birth certificate. 
On Saturday June 6, 1987, P. was dis-
charged from the hospital. P.'s mother 
assumed financial responsibility and took 
P. and the baby to her home. Appellant 
did not pay any of the hospital bills but did 
eventually pay $45 toward the obstetri-
cian's bill. 
and has no governmental agency or entity in-
volved in its internal operation, affairs, or deci-
sions except as expressly authorized by the li-
censing statute. 
S1 JTNE v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES Utah 935 
Cite at 761 P.2d 932 (UuhApp. 1988) 
made an appointment with 5:00 that afternoon, P. gave custody of the 
baby to respondent and left for California 
the following day, June 10. During this 
trip, she called appellant each day and p re 
tended that she had the child with her. 
F.'s 
respondent . r June 8, 1987, so that P. 
could discuss placing the baby for adoption. 
On June 8, P. brought the baby to appel-
lant's apartment for a visit. She did not 
inform him that she was planning to place 
the baby for adoption. The same day, P. 
and her parents took the baby to respon-
dent where a counselor explained the adop-
tion process to them. During this meeting, 
P. told the counselor that appellant had no 
interest in marriage nor in living with and 
supporting her and the baby. 
The counselor told P. that the decision to 
place the baby for adoption was hers alone 
to make and that if she was not sure, she 
could place the baby in temporary foster 
care until she decided. P. decided that it 
was in the baby's best interest to place her 
for adoption. She then signed an affidavit 
and release relinquishing custody of the 
baby to respondent to place her for adop-
tion, stating that she was doing this of her 
own free will and choice, and that she 
understood what she was doing.2 
During the meeting, the counselor tele-
phoned the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the 
Utah Department of Health and inquired 
whether an acknowledgment of paternity 
had been filed for the child. She was in-
formed that one had not been filed. Be-
cause it was late in the day, the counselor 
permitted P. to take the baby home that 
night and bring her back the following day. 
On June 9, P. and the baby visited appel-
lant at his apartment. She did not inform 
him of the relinquishment, but told him 
that she was going to California and was 
taking the baby with her. She testified 
that she was afraid to tell him about the 
relinquishment because of his recent inter-
est in the child, his potential retaliation 
against her family, and because he was 
upset that she was going to California. At 
2. P. later testified that she was emotionally un-
stable at the time because she was concerned 
over appellant's lack of commitment to her and 
because of parental pressure in that her parents 
had told her that she could have no contact with 
her family if she kept the baby. She also stated 
that she did not tell the counselor much about 
her relationship with appellant because her par-
ents, who did not like him, were in the room 
with her. However, P., "[ajfter considering all 
Respondent transferred custody of the 
baby to the adoptive parents on June 12, 
1987. The child has resided with the adop-
tive parents ever since. 
On June 13, P. called appellant's family 
and, because she was afraid to tell appel-
lant the truth, told them that the baby was 
dead. Appellant's mother called the hospi-
tal in California to see if it had any record 
of the baby and discovered the deception. 
When appellant called P. back, she admit-
ted her deception, informed appellant of 
the adoption, and agreed to return to Salt 
Lake City to help him attempt to gain 
custody of the child. 
On June 15, appellant filed an acknowl-
edgment of paternity with the Registrar of 
Vital Statistics. He and P. filed an affida-
vit to amend the child's birth certificate to 
add his name as the father and to give the 
child his last name. They then went to 
respondent to ask for the child, but wtre 
advised by the counselor that it was too 
late, the child had already been placed with 
adoptive parents, and that they would have 
to contact their lawyers. 
On June 29, appellant brought suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Federal District Court, 
requesting custody of the child. J u ^ e J. 
Thomas Greene found that the federal 
court had jurisdiction over the case because 
state action was present and the persons 
involved in the adoption were state actors. 
However, at respondent's request, Judge 
Greene elected to abstain to allow the state 
courts to interpret section 78-30-4, dismiss-
ing the case on September 3, 1987. 
the circumstances, such as Steven's lack of in-
terest in me and the baby, my inability to sup-
port and rear the baby alone, the problems of 
bringing a . . . baby into a possible marriage 
with another man, and the need of the baby to 
have a good home/' chose to relinquish the 
baby. Her articulated reasons for relinquishing 
indicate that, despite the emotional turmoil she 
was going through, she had thought out and 
deliberately made an uncoerced decision. 
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Appellant then filed this state court ac-
ion on September 7, 1987, On September 
4,1987, he filed a motion for a preliminary 
njunction prohibiting respondent from con-
inuing to deny him custody of the child 
luring the pendency of the state action. 
On December 31, 1987, after an eviden-
iary hearing, the trial judge denied appel-
ant's motion, specifically finding that (I) 
4it was not impossible for [appellant] to 
have filed his notice of claim of paternity 
prior to the date the child was relinquished 
for adoption"; (2) appellant, throughout 
P.'s pregnancy, "did not behave in a man-
ner consistent with that of a concerned, 
committed father, nor did he clearly artic-
ulate an intent or desire to assume the 
responsibilities of parenthood or to keep 
and rear the child"; and (3) appellant, if 
awarded custody of the child, would relin-
quish her to his sister to care for, rather 
than caring for her himself. 
On February 24,1988, respondent moved 
for summary judgment 
A hearing on this motion was held on 
March 4, 1988. The court granted respon-
dent's motion for summary judgment, dis-
missed appellant's action, and awarded 
costs to respondent, finding that (1) there 
was no genuine issue as to any material 
fact; (2) respondent's acts did not consti-
tute state action; and (3) section 78-30-4 
was valid on its face and as applied under 
the due process and equal protection provi-
sions of the Utah and United States Consti-
tutions. 
On March 15, 1987, appellant filed a no-
tice of appeal before this Court. His ap-
peal raises the following issues: (1) Did 
respondent's conduct constitute sufficient 
"state action" to invoke constitutional pro-
tections? (2) If so, does section 78-30-4 
(1987), as applied to the facts in this case, 
violate the equal protection provisions of 
the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 24 
of the Utah Constitution, or the due pro-
cess provisions of the first and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution? (3) Does section 78-30-4 vio-
late the provisions of article I, section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution? 
STATE ACTION 
[1] The fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees of equal protection and due process 
apply "only if the deprivation of life, liber-
ty, or property is by governmental 'state 
action' rather than by purely private ac-
tion." Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670 
F.Supp. 1537, 1540 (D.Utah 1987). This 
case involves the termination of appellant's 
parental rights, a liberty interest which has 
repeatedly been recognized as worthy of 
constitutional protection by the United 
States Supreme Court Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct 1208, 1212, 31 
L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Lu-
gar r. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 
102 S.Ct 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), delin-
eated a two-prong test for determining 
whether state action was involved in a dep-
rivation: (1) the deprivation must be caused 
by the exercise of a state-created right or 
privilege, and (2) the party charged with 
the deprivation must be a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor. Id, at 
941, 102 S.Ct at 2755; accord Dirks v. 
CornwelU 754 P.2d 946, 950 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). Respondent argues that its conduct 
in placing the baby for adoption did not 
constitute state action because the adoptive 
placement of children is not the exclusive 
prerogative of the state, so is not a state-
created right or privilege. Further, be-
cause respondent receives no state funding 
and has no governmental control over its 
internal affairs, it is not a state actor. 
However, this argument sidesteps the real 
issue, whether respondent may be con-
sidered to be a state actor in terminating 
appellant's parental rights through the op-
eration of section 78-30-4, rather than in 
placing appellant's child for adoption. 
Prior Utah cases interpreting section 78-
30-4, although not explicitly addressing 
this state action issue, assume the exist-
ence of state action in the operation of this 
statute. For example, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Wells v. Children '$ Aid Society 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984) 
SWAYNE v. L.D.S. SOCIAL S E R V E S 
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(quoting In re Boyer, 636 R2d 1085, 1087- section 78-30-4, the 
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88 (Utah 1981)), stated that "[w]hen state 
action impinges on fundamental rights, due 
process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissible conduct so 
as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those 
rights/' 
We, therefore, concur with the finding of 
the United States District Court in 
Swayne, that state action indeed existed in 
the present circumstances, because (1) 
"[ujndoubtedly, the State was responsible 
for the statute"; Swayne, 670 F.Supp. at 
1541 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938, 102 
S.Ct. at 2754); and (2) the statute involved 
is self-operative and mandates the termi-
nation of appellant's parental rights. Id. 
As Judge Greene explained: 
The State of Utah, not a private party, 
has made an official policy decision that 
any time custody of an illegitimate child 
is relinquished by the mother, the fa-
ther's parental rights will be automatical-
ly cut off unless a notice of paternity 
previously has been filed by the biologi-
cal father. That state decision to termi-
nate the father s parental rights is imple-
mented through the actor or actors who 
accept the child for placement, whether a 
state entity, a private licensed adoption 
agency, or any other person, for example 
an attorney. It would be a total fiction 
to allow the state to remove itself from 
its decision to cut off parental rights 
simply because a private party triggers 
operation of the statute. The only fair 
conclusion is that such a private party 
becomes a "state actor" when his or her 
actions bring the statute into play so as 
to effectuate the pre-determined state de-
cision to terminate parental rights. 
Id. at 1541-42 (emphasis in original). 
Judge Greene also noted that even though 
a private party may deprive a parent of the 
physical custody of his child, only the state 
may irrevocably sever all parental rights. 
Thus, state action is present in the opera-
tion of section 78-30-4. IdL at 1542. 
In view of this determination, we reverse 
the lower court's finding that state action 
did not exist Because we have determined 
state action does exist in the operation of 
question becomes 
whether this state action has deprived ap-
pellant of his constitutional rights. 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
[2] Appellant first argues that section 
78-30-4, as applied to these facts, violates 
his constitutional right to equal protection 
under the United States Constitution. He 
asserts that the similarly situated parents 
of an illegitimate child are given different 
legal rights solely on the basis of their sex 
since the mother's consent is required prior 
to any adoption of the child regardless of 
whether she is willing to fulfill her parental 
responsibilities while the father has the 
right to consent to the child's adoption only 
if he files an acknowledgment of paternity 
indicating his willingness and intent to sup-
port the child pursuant to section 78-30-4. 
"The essence of equal protection is that 
legislative classifications resulting in dif-
fering treatment for different persons 
must be based on actual differences that 
are reasonably related to the legitimate 
purposes of the legislation." Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). Although 
appellant recognizes the legitimacy of the 
purposes of section 78-30-4, \ hich are to 
speedily identify those persons who will 
assume the parental role over illegitimate 
children and to facilitate immediate and 
continuing physical care of and emotional 
bonding opportunities for such children, 
Wells, 681 P.2d at 204, he alleges that the 
classifications of section 78-30-4 are based 
on differences that are not reasonably re-
lated to these purposes. He first states 
that the statute defeats its objective by 
failing to require the mother of an illegit-
imate child to take action to identify herself 
as a willing parent as fathers are required 
to do since an unfit and indifferent mother 
can prevent the adoption of her child and, 
thus, fail to provide appropriate physical 
care and emotional bonding opportunities 
for the child. He then states that the 
statutory objective is also defeated because 
it results in gender-based discrimination 
against "identified, present, and willing fa-
thers" who would, in fact, provide the nec-
essary care and bonding opportunities for 
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the child, and that an indifferent mother 
can arbitrarily deprive such a father of his 
parental rights under the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ellis v. So-
cial Services Department of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), has held that .section 
78-30-4 does nut, or. r s face, violate the 
equal protection rights of an unwed father 
because the father's parental rights are the 
same as the mother's and the same as if 
the child had been born legitimate, provid-
ing he timely files hi: acknowledgment < f 
paternity pursuant to the statute. Where 
the father fails to come forward by timely 
filing an acknowledgment of paternity or 
by developing a substantial relationship 
with the child, the equal protection clause 
does not preclude the state from terminat-
ing his parental rights. Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 
1769, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979). 
In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court re-
affirmed Ellis, finding that there are rea-
sonable bases for statutory differentiation 
between unwed mothers and fathers and 
between fathers who file an acknowledg-
ment of paternity and those who do not. 
Wells, 681 P.2d at 204. The court also 
found that these classifications are reason-
ably calculated to serve the proper govern-
mental objectives of (1) promptly identify-
ing those fathers who will acknowledge 
parental responsibilities, and (2) speedily 
making children available for adoption. Id. 
The Wells court, although recognizing that 
many unwed fathers are unidentified and 
uninterested, stated that: 
fathers who have "fulfilled a parental 
role over a considerable period of time 
are entitled to a high degree of protec-
tion," whereas unwed fathers "whose re-
lationships to their children are merely 
biological or very attenuated" are enti-
tled to a lesser degree of protection. 
"When an unwed father demon-
strates a full commitment to the respon-
sibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] for-
ward to participate in the rearing of his 
child/ his interest in personal contact 
with his child acquires substantial protec-
tion under the due process clause 
But the mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent constitu-
tional protection." 
Id. at 203 (quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 
1364, 1375 (Utah 1982) and Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 
2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983)) (emphasis in 
original). 
[3} On the other hand, unlike unwed 
fathers, unwed mothers a^e "automatically 
identified by virtue of their role in the 
process of birth." Wells, 681 P.2d at 203. 
However, if shown to be an unfit or indif-
ferent parent on account of cruelty, ne-
glect, or desertion of the child, a mother 
may have her parental rights judicially ter-
minated and the child put up for adoption 
without her consent pursuant to section 
78-30-4(1). Her parental rights will be ter-
minated if she is shown to be unwilling to 
fulfill her parental responsibilities. 
Thus, appellant's argument that the stat-
utory classifications are based on gender 
differences that are not reasonably related 
to the statutory purposes fails. 
[4] Appellant next argues that we 
should not follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Ellis because, as he 
asserts, that opinion was based upon inher-
ently contradictory statutory provisions 
found in sections 78-30-4 and 78-30-12. 
He argues that the protection afforded 
unwed fathers under section 78-30-12 is 
illusory because a father who has publicly 
acknowledged his child may lose his paren-
tal rights anyway by failing to file under 
section 7&-30-4. 
In In the Matter of the Adoption of 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah CtApp. 
1988), this Court recently rejected this ar-
gument, holding that these two statutes 
are not inconsistent but operate indepen-
dently in the appropriate factual contexts: 
We interpret the statutes [sections 78-
30-4 and 78-30-12] as follows: when the 
unwed father acknowledges his child, 
within the meaning of the acknowledg-
ment statute [section 78-30-12], prior to 
the mother's relinquishment of the child 
or prior to the filing of the petition for 
adoption, then the father need not com-
ply with the requirements of the paterni-
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ty statute [section 78-30-4], However, if 
the claimed acts of acknowledgment oc-
cur after the mother's relinquishment .>r 
after the petition for adoption has been 
filed, then the paternity statute [section 
78-30-4] governs. 
Id, at p. 910. Thus, contrary to appellant's 
argument, the protections offered the 
unwed father under section 78-30-12 are 
not illusory because section 78-30-4 does 
not apply to him if he has fulfilled the 
adoption by acknowledgment requirements. 
He is protected under both sections. 
[5,6] If an unwed father establishes a 
substantial relationship over a number of 
years with his children, his rights cannot be 
extinguished without his consent under sec-
tion 78-30-12. Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1255. 
Similarly, a caring, involved unwed father 
may file pursuant to section 78-30-4 even 
before such a substantial relationship has 
developed to acquire the same rights. The 
unwed mother cannot, then, arbitrarily di-
vest him of parental rights and the unwed 
father has the same rights to consent to 
the adoption of his child as the mother. 
[7] Although appellant argues that sec-
tion 78-30-4 violates his constitutional 
right to equal protection as applied, he 
raises no discernable argument on facts 
unique to this case: He failed to file an 
acknowledgement of paternity prior to the 
relinquishment of the child, and failed to 
communicate concern for and interest in 
the child apart from his few visits with her. 
He did not come forth after the birth of the 
child to assert his claim to paternity nor did 
he agree to support the child. He denied 
paternity for the major part of the preg-
nancy and, even after admitting paternity, 
never indicated to the mother or to anyone 
else any desire to marry her, to live togeth-
er with her and the child, or even to person-
ally raise the child. As such, it is not 
unjust for him to be classified with other 
3. Stanley is inapposite to this case because of 
distinguishable facts: Peter Stanley was de-
prived of his children with whom he had lived 
and had raised for eighteen years. Upon the 
death of the children's mother, they were placed 
with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an 
Illinois statute which required that'children of 
unwed fathers become wards of the state upon 
similarly situated unwed fathers who have 
lost their parental rights by not coming 
forward to acknowledge their parental re-
sponsibilities. 
[8] Appellant's fourth argument is that 
section 78-30-4 violates the equal protec-
tion provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
"As a general rule, we will not engage in 
state constitutional analysis unless an ar-
gument for different analyses under the 
state and federal constitutions is briefed." 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 
(Utah 1988). Because appellant has not set 
forth a separate state constitutional analy-
sis in his brief, we do not respond to this 
argument. Merely stating that the statute 
violates the Utah Constitution without ar-
guing the specific conflicts is not sufficient. 
We find that appellant's equal protection 
argument fails. 
DUE PROCESS 
Appellant asserts that section 78-30-4 
violates the due process clauses of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. He 
argues that the statute operates to termi-
nate an unwed father's parental rights be-
fore any adjudication of abandonment oc-
curs, thus making failure to file an ac-
knowledgment of paternity an irrebuttable 
presumption that he has abandoned his 
child. Relying on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 657, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1215, 31 L.Ed. 
2d 551 (1971), which states that procedures 
cannot stand which "explicitly [disdain] 
present realities in deference to past for-
malities," 3 he asserts that the statute vio-
lates due process because the fact pre-
sumed, abandonment, does not follow from 
his actual behavior in that he visited the 
child daily for the four days following the 
child's birth, invited his family to visit her, 
publicly acknowledged his paternity, and 
never clearly expressed an intention to re-
linquish his parental rights. 
the death of their mothers. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
646, 92 S.CL at 1210. The Court found this 
statute to be unconstitutional because it created 
an irrebuttable presumption that unwed fathers 
were unfit parents. In the present case, appel-
lant has not developed a comparable substantial 
relationship with his child. 
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This argument is, essentially, an attack 
on the constitutionality of the statute. The 
Utah Supreme Court has already settled 
this issue in Wells. Applying an even more 
stringent standard oi review than required 
under the United States Constitution be-
cause of the fundamental nature of paren-
tal rights, the Wells court determined that 
section 78-30-4 is facially ^alid under the 
due process clause of the Utah Constitution 
because (1) the state has a compelling inter-
est in speedily identifying those persons 
who will assume a parental role over new-
born illegitimate children, and (2) the stat-
ute is narrowly tailored to achieve these 
purposes because there is no infringement 
of the unwed father's rights not essential 
to the statute's purposes. Wells, 681 P.2d 
at 206-07. 
[9] Further, appellant misconstrues the 
import of the statute. Because of his 
unwed status, he does not have p. rental 
rights subject to termination until he as-
serts them by either filing an acknowledg-
ment of paternity pursuant to section 78-
30-4 or by establishing a substantial rela-
tionship with the child pursuant to section 
78-30-12. If he does either of the above, 
he preserves his parental rights. If he 
fails to come forward, he has no parental 
rights to abandon. The statute cannot cre-
ate an irrebuttable presumption of aban-
donment where parental rights do not ex-
ist. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
the nature of this subject matter make> a 
firm cutoff date reasonable, if not essen-
tial, because of the disruption to the chil-
dren involved by the protracted litigation 
that a contrary holding would produce. 
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 
P.2d 753, 755-56 (Utah 1984). Further, 
marriage is the institution established by 
society for the procreation and rearing of 
children, and because of the disproportion-
ate number of social problems involving 
illegitimate children, it is not 
too harsh to require that those respon-
sible for bringing children into the world 
outside the established institution of 
marriage should be required either to 
comply with those statutes that accord 
them the opportunity to assert their pa-
rental rights or to yield to the method 
established by society to raise children in 
a manner best suited to promote their 
welfare. 
Id at 756; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263, 
103 S.Ct at 2994. 
[10] Appellant also argues that section 
78-30-4, as applied, violates his due pro-
cess rights. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that situations may arise in 
which it is impossible, through no fault of 
his own, for an unwed father to file the 
required notice of paternity prior to the 
statutory bar. In re Adoption of Baby 
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986); 
Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256. In such a situa-
tion, due process requires that the unwed 
father be permitted to show that he was 
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
comply with the statute. If the father 
successfully shows that termination of his 
parental rights is contrary to basic notions 
of due process and if he comes forward 
within a reasonable time after the baby's 
birth, he is deemed to have complied with 
the statute. Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256. 
Such situations existed in Ellis and in 
Baby Boy Doe. In Ellis, the child's moth-
er and father resided in California. The 
mother left California just prior to the 
child's birth without advising the father as 
to where the birth was to occur. When the 
child was born, she declared the father to 
be unknown, and relinquished the child 
four days later. The court found that the 
father was entitled to an opportunity to 
show, as a factual matter, that he could not 
reasonably have expected his baby to be 
born in Utah. Id. at 1256. 
Likewise, in Baby Boy Doe, the father 
was not a Utah resident and had spent less 
than a week in the state. Prior to the 
baby's birth, the mother had told the father 
that she would move to Arizona with him, 
thus alleviating any concern he might have 
had about a potential adoption. The father 
then travelled to Arizona, found employ-
ment and a place to live, and moved the 
couple's belongings from California to Ari-
zona. Because all parties were aware of 
the father's intent and desire to raise the 
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child, the mother's family deliberately with-
held information about the child's birth to 
avoid his obstruction of the adoption. The 
baby was born early while the father was 
travelling from California to Arizona, Con-
sequently, the father was unaware of the 
birth for three days, and only became 
aware of it one day after the petition for 
adoption had been filed. This father suc-
cessfully showed that the termination of 
his parental rights was contrary to the 
basic notions of due process and that he 
came forward within a reasonable time af-
ter the baby's birth. Thus, the court 
deemed him to have complied with the stat-
ute. Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d at 690-91. 
This "impossibility'1' exception is inappli-
cable, however, in cases which do not in-
volve situations where it is impossible for 
the father to file the required notice 
through no fault of his own. Wells, 681 
P.2d at 207. 
The Wells court found that no impossibil-
ity existed under the following facts: The 
birth occurred in the same state as the 
father's residence. Neither the child's 
mother nor the adoption agency were in-
volved in an effort to prevent the father 
from learning of the birth or from assert-
ing his parental rights. Neither knew at 
the time of the relinquishment that the 
father was seeking to assert his parental 
rights. The father had advance notice of 
the expected time of the birth and the fact 
that the mother intended to relinquish the 
child for adoption. Further, the father had 
advice of counsel on filing the required 
form, and had a copy of the form provided 
by a social worker. Id. at 207-08. 
Likewise, in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, the court determined that section 
78-30-4 was no* unconstitutionally applied: 
Both parents were Utah residents. Prior 
to the birth, the mother had told the father 
she would not live with nor marry him and 
that she was considering adoption. To-
gether, the couple attended a counseling 
session at the agency which later took cus-
tody of the child for adoption. The father 
visited the mother and child in the hospital 
prior to the time the child was relinquished. 
On the day the child was relinquished, the 
mother called the father and told him to 
come to the hospital if he wanted to see the 
baby one last time. When the father went 
to the hospital, he did not protest the moth-
er's decision to place the child for adoption, 
but did attempt to sign the birth certificate. 
He then filed a notice of paternity after the 
baby was relinquished for adoption. Baby 
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d at 690; Sanchez, 680 
P.2d at 75. 
[11] In the present situation, both ap-
pellant and P. were residents of Salt Lake 
County at the time the child was born. 
Appellant WL< aware of the time and loca-
tion of the child's birth. As in Sanchez, no 
one had attempted to withhold from appel-
lant any information regarding the child's 
birth. Appellant had made it clear to P. 
prior to the child's birth that he was not 
going to marry her, live with her, or as-
sume any financial rer; sibility for her or 
for the baby. As in Sanchez, appellant 
was present at the birth and visiteu P. and 
the child in the hospital. Appellant knew 
of the possibility of the child's adoption 
from March 1987 when P. told him that her 
parents wanted her to relinquish the child. 
He told her that adoption should be her 
decision. At the hospital, appellant was 
instructed by P. that he had to sign an 
acknowledgment of paternity to appear as 
the father on the child's birth certificate, 
but did not sign i t P. signed the relin-
quishment on June 8th, four days after the 
child was born, and surrendered custody on 
June 9th. Although reprehensible, P.'s at-
tempt to mislead appellant about the relin-
quishment by telling hH that she had tak-
en the child to California and that the child 
had died was irrelevant because it came 
after the fact. 
Appellant had every reasonable opportu-
nity to register prior to the act of relin-
quishment. He also had actual knowledge 
of the requirement to register, not only 
from P.'s informing him of this necessity at 
the hospital, but also because he, himself, 
had relinquished his rights to a previous 
child a year earlier. 
These facts more closely resemble those 
in Wells and Sanchez, in which the impossi-
bility exception was inapplicable, than 
those in Ellis and Baby Boy Doe. We 
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concur with the trial court and find that 
appellant had an opportunity to file his 
acknowledgment of paternity, and that it 
was not impossible for him to do so prior to 
the relinquishment through no fault of his 
own. As the Sanchez court stated, "[i]t is 
of no constitutional importance that the 
father came close to complying with the 
statute/1 Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. We, 
therefo/e, hold that section 78-30-4 was 
not unconstitutionally applied to appellant. 
OPEN COURTS 
Finally, appellant raises the issue of 
whether section 78-30-4 violates the open 
court provisions in article I section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution. Appellant did not 
raise this issue below, but first raised it on 
appeal to this court. As a general rule, we 
do not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal, so decline to address this 
issue. Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755 
P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct.App.1988); James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
We reverse the trial court's ruling concern-
ing state action, but affirm the order deny-
ing appellant custody of the child. Be-
cause appellant is not the prevailing party, 
we do not address the issue of attorney 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Each part}' is 
to bear its own costs on appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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Laura Lee Bloxham FULLMER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Brian Keith FULLMER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 870499-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 16, 1988. 
Action was brought to modify child 
custody provision of divorce decree. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
L. Park, J., transferred custody, and appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that custodial parent's placement of 
child in day care when she took full-time 
employment did not constitute change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant trans-
fer of custody. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Divorce <8=»184(5, 6) 
Where all evidence in divorce decree 
modification suit was offered by proffer, 
reviewing court would review proffered 
facts and draw its own legal conclusions 
therefrom; trial court's decision would not 
be disturbed absent showing of abuse or 
discretion or manifest injustice. 
2. Divorce <s=>303(2) 
In order to modify child custody provi-
sions of divorce decree, trial court must 
consider whether there has been substan-
tial change in custodial parent's circum-
stances justifying reexamination of prior 
custody award, and, if such change has 
occurred, determine what placement is in 
best interest of child. 
3. Divorce <s=>303(2) 
In determining whether change of cir-
cumstances warrants reopening of child 
custody provisions of divorce decree, court 
must focus exclusively on evaluation of 
custodial parent's change of circumstances 
and effect on child; only if change of cir-
cumstances io found to exist may court 
address issue of noncustodial parent's 
changing circumstances, as part of deter-
mination of whether it is in best interest of 
child to transfer custody. 
4. Divorce <s=»3Q3(2) 
Fact that custodial parent took full-
time work and placed child in day care was 
within reasonable contemplation of noncus-
todial parent at time he stipulated to custo-
dy arrangement, and thus was not legally 
cognizable change of circumstance such as 
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Liberal, Kansas. Thus, in order to keep 
presentation of evidence to the jury run-
ning smoothly, it would be more expedi-
tious to try the case in Topeka. The court 
notes that the defendants represent that 
Fred Phelps, plaintiffs counsel, has agreed 
that the case should be tried in Topeka. 
The court therefore finds that defendants' 
Bunnell and Arheart's motion to transfer 
the trial setting to Topeka is hereby grant-
ed. 
IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE 
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for re-
consideration of the Court's Memorandum 
and Order filed April 8, 1987, which grant-
ed summary judgment to defendant Duck-
worth on the grounds of judicial immunity 
is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER OR-
DERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to 
file a second amendment to her complaint 
is granted in part. Plaintiff shall have 
leave to file a second amendment to name 
the State of Kansas as a party defendant. 
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second 
amendment to the complaint which names 
Keaton G. Duckworth as a defendant is 
hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER OR-
DERED that the defendants Bunnell and 
Arheart's motion to transfer the tnal set-
ting to Topeka is hereby granted. 
DATED: This 26th day of June, 1987, at 
Kansas City, Kansas. 
Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe, 
Jane Doe and Leslie Doe, in his or her 
official capacity as a District Court 
Judge of the Third District Court of the 
State of Utah, Defendants. 
Civ. No. 87-C-0591G. 
United States District Court, 
D Utah, CD. 
Sept. 3, 1987. 
Putative father of infant brought ac-
tion pursuant to § 1983 in which he at-
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tempted to gain right of custody, care and 
control of newborn child who had been 
surrendered by mother to private adoption 
agency. On motion to dismiss by adoption 
agency and prospective adoptive parents, 
and putative father's motion for prelimi-
nary injunction, the District Court, J. 
Thomas Greene, J., held that: (1) private 
adoption agency and prospective adoptive 
parents were "state actors" through uti-
lization of adoption statute for purposes of 
father's § 1983 action; (2) proper persons 
were named as parties; and (3) abstention 
by federal court was required. 
Motion to dismiss granted. 
1. Civil Rights o=>13.5(4) 
Invocation of state statute, which re-
quired that any time custody of illegitimate 
child is relinquished by mother, father's 
parental rights will be automatically cut off 
unless notice of paternity previously has 
been filed by biological father, by private 
individual such as adoption agency or attor-
ney constitutes state action for purposes of 
§ 1983 civil rights action brought 1/ bio-
logical father for purposes of regaining 
custody of infant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
2. Civil Rights <s=»13.11 
In § 1983 action by putative father for 
determination of his parental rights, which 
challenged operation of statute which pro-
vided that father of illegitimate child con-
clusively is presumed to have abandoned 
child if he fails to file claim of paternity 
and notice of willingness to support child 
prior to time child is placed by mother with 
licensed adoption agency, father was only 
required to name as parties child's mother 
who relinquished all custody and control of 
child, adoption agency, and prospective 
adoptive parents. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.C.A.1953, 7&-30-4. 
3. Federal Courts <3=>48 
Federal court abstained from render-
ing decision in putative father's challenge 
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to termination of his parental rights by 
operation of state adoption statute, though 
he named proper parties in § 1983 action; 
father may be able to establish that as 
applied, state statute was violative of 
greater protections of State Constitution, 
thereby mooting federal constitutional 
question and case presented important 
questions of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
M. David Eckersley, Billy L. Walker, Jr., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff. 
David M. McConkie, B. Lloyd Poelman, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
J. THOMAS GREENE, District 
Judge. 
This matter came on for hearing on July 
27, 1987 on defendants' motion to dismiss 
and plaintiffs motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Defendants were represented by 
David M. McConkie and B. Lloyd Poelman 
and plaintiff was represented by M. David 
Eckersley and Billy L. Walker, Jr. Plain-
tiff and defendants submitted memoran-
dums of law and a stipulated statement of 
facts and the court heard oral argument, 
after which the matters were taken under 
advisement. The court is now fully ad-
vised and sets forth its Memorandum Deci-
sion and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
This suit is brought by plaintiff against 
L.D.S. Social Services, a non-profit private 
adoption agency affiliated with the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; John 
Doe and Jane Doe, who are prospective 
adoptive parents of the newborn child of 
which plaintiff is the biological father, and 
Leslie Doe, who is asserted to be a District 
Court Judge of the Third District Court of 
Utah who plaintiff believes has presently 
before him or her a petition for adoption. 
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and requests that this court declare 
that he has the right of custody, care and 
control of the newborn child, that the provi-
sions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1984) 
be declared violative of the United States 
Constitution, that Judge Doe be enjoined 
from entering any Decree of Adoption 
without plaintiffs consent, and that dam-
ages be awarded as against defendant 
L.D.S. Social Services. The immediate mat-
ter of a preliminary injunction involves a 
request by plaintiff that he be granted 
custody and that defendant L.D.S. Social 
Services be enjoined from continuing to 
exercise custody over the chilJ 
Plaintiff and defendants have filed a 
statement containing the following stipu-
lated facts: 
1. Steven Swayne is the natural fa-
ther of a baby girl born out of wedlock 
on June 4, 1987. 
2. Penny Paxman is the mother of 
the child. 
3. Both Steven Swayne and Penny 
Paxman are life-long residents of the 
State of Utah and resided in the State of 
Utah at all times pertinent to the facts 
and circumstances in this matter 
4. Steven Swayne first learned that 
Penny Paxman wras pregnant in October, 
1986. 
5. Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
are not now married nor have they ever 
been married. At no time during Penny 
Paxman's pregnancy or prior to the relin-
quishment of the child to L.D.S. Social 
Services did Steven Swayne offer to mar-
ry Penny Paxman or offer to financially 
support Penny Paxman. 
6. At no time during the pregnancy 
or prior to the relinquishment of the child 
did Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
have any plan or intention to live togeth-
er in a family unit. 
7. Steven Swayne was present in the 
hospital when the child was born on June 
4, 1987, and visited the child and Perm} 
Paxman while they were in the hospital 
While in the hospital, Mr. Swayne was 
told that it was necessary for him to sign 
a document in order to have his name 
placed on the child's birth certificate. 
Mr. Swayne did not sign the necessary 
document or acknowledgment of paterni-
ty before the child was discharged from 
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the hospital or before the child was relin-
quished to L.D.S. Social Services and 
therefore his name does not appear on 
the child's birth certificate. 
8. Penny Paxman's mother dis-
charged Penny and the baby from the 
hospital on June 6,1987, and made finan-
cial arrangements for hospital expenses. 
Mr. Swayne has not paid any of the 
hospital expenses or paid any of the ex-
penses for the baby's support. 
9. Prior to the pregnancy and during 
the course of the pregnancy, Penny Pax-
man resided with her parents. After be-
ing released from the hospital, Penny 
Paxman and her child returned to her 
parent's home. 
10. Steven Swayne offered to make 
arrangemerts for Penny Paxman to 
move in with his mother. However, Pen-
ny Paxman would have provided her own 
living expenses. 
11. Penny Paxman signed an affida-
vit releasing the child to L.D.S. Social 
Services on June 8, 1987, and physically 
surrendered custody of the child the next 
day. 
12. Steven Swayne did not register 
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics in 
the Department of Health a notice of his 
claim of paternity of an illegitimate child 
and of his willingness and intent to sup-
port the child to the best of his ability 
prior to the date the illegitimate child 
was relinquished or placed with L.D.S. 
•Social Services for adoption. 
13. Steven Swayne filed his acknowl-
edgment of paternity on June 15, 1987, 
which was the first working day after he 
learned that the child had been placed for 
adoption. 
14 During the course of the pregnan-
cy, Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
discussed the fact that Penny Paxman's 
parents wanted her to place the baby for 
adoption. Penny Paxman did not inform 
Mr. Swayne that she did or did not intend 
to surrender the child for adoption. 
15 L.D.S. Social Services placed the 
child for adoption with an adoptive fami-
ly on June 12, 1987, in conformity with 
the requirements of Utah statutes. 
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16. In the event Steven Swayne is 
granted custody of the child, Mr. Swayne 
intends to place the child under the pri-
mary care of members of his family until 
such time as he can become more stable. 
17. On June 15, 1987, Steven Swayne 
and Penny Paxman requested an amend-
ment to the birth certificate of the child 
naming Steven Swayne as the father of 
the child. 
18. During the course of the pregnan-
cy and thereafter Mr. Swayne told his 
family and others that he was the father 
of the child. 
19. Penny Paxman took the baby to 
Steven Swayne's apartment for a short 
visit once before the relinquishment to 
L.D.S. Social Services and once after the 
relinquishment. 
20. Mr. Swayne was unaware of his 
duty to file an acknowledgment of pater-
nity and willingness to support the child 
until after the child had been released by 
the mother for adoption. 
21. On June 15, 1987, both Mr. 
Swayne and Penny Paxman appeared at 
the offices of L.D.S. Social Services and 
asked that custody be given to Mr. 
Swayne. 
22. L.D.S. Social Services has testi-
fied that at the time of the relinquish-
ment of the child to L.D.S. Social Servic-
es Penny Paxman did not disclose the 
identity of Steven Swayne and advised 
L.D.S. Social Services that he would not 
take responsibility for the child and that 
she did not want L.D.S. Social Services to 
contact him. 
23. On February 9, 1986, Steven 
Swayne consented to the adoptive place-
ment of another illegitimate child by a 
different woman. L.D.S. Social Services 
requested and obtained his consent. 
Defendant L.D.S. Social Services urges 
this court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure to 
allege "state action,'' and on the further 
ground that this court should abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction in favor of resolu-
tion by the state courts of Utah. The 
defendants also urge dismissal of plain-
tiffs motion for preliminary injunction pri-
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marily because of lack of substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. State Action 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution provides in part 
"No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." (emphasis added). The protections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment thus apply 
only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property is by governmental "state action" 
rather by than purely private action. The 
fundamental policies of the state action 
principle are to preserve an area of individ-
1. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922. 
936-37, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753. 73 L.Ed.2d 482 
(1982); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250, 
83 S.Ct. 1119, 1133, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963) (Har-
lan, J., concurring and dissenting); GviV Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 25, 27 L.Ed. 835 
(1883); see generally L. Tribe, American Consti-
tutional Law, § 18^ 2 at 1149 (1978). 
2. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 
1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) the Court recog-
nized the weighty "liberty" interest of one father 
of illegitimate children in maintaining custody 
of those children with whom he had a fully 
developed parental relationship: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the 
children he has sired and raised, undeniably 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain 
that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children "come[s] to this Court with a 
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is 
made to liberties which derive merely from 
shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v. 
Cooper [336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448. 93 L.Ed. 513 
(1949)].... The Court has frequently em-
phasized the importance of the family. The 
rights to conceive and to raise one's children 
have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Ne-
braska (262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 
1042 (1923)] . . . "basic civil rights of man," 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 
1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)] . . . and M[r]ights 
far more precious . . . than property rights," 
May v. Anderson [345 U.S. 528. 73 S.Ct. 840, 
97 LEd. 1221 (1953)].... "It is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary' function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither 
ual freedom to make choices without the 
constraints of the Constitution's prohibi-
tions, to further the policy of federalism by 
reserving to the state discretion to deal 
with perceived private wrongs without the 
constraints of supreme federal law, and to 
further the policy of separation of powers 
by limiting the wrongs redressable by the 
federal judiciary absent congressional en-
actment granting such authority.1 
The "liberty" interest asserted by plain-
tiff in this case involves termination of all 
parental rights in connection with his new-
born child, including visitation and custodi-
al rights. Without delving deeply into the 
merits, this court recognizes that plaintiff 
has asserted a liberty interest that has 
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
to be worthy of constitutional protection.2 
supply nor hinder" Prince v. Massachusetts 
[321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 
(1944)].... 
Id. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. More recently the 
Court distinguished the lesser constitutional in-
terest of a putative father in the potential to 
develop a future parental relationship with his 
child: 
The difference between the developed parent-
child relationship that was implicated in Stan-
ley and Caban [v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ]. and the 
potential relationship involved in Quillom [v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 
511 (1978)] and this case, is both clear and 
significant. When an unwed father demon-
strates a full commitment to the responsibili-
ties of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child," Caban, 
. . . his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under 
the Due Process Clause. At that point it may 
be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his 
children " But the mere existence of a 
biological link does not merit equivalent con-
stitutional protection . . . The significance of 
the biological connection is that it offers the 
natural father an opportunity that no other 
male possesses to develop a relationship with 
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity 
and accepts some measure of responsibiiit} 
for the child's future, he may enjoy the bless-
ings of the parent-child relationship and make 
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's 
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal 
Constitution will not automatically compel a 
State to listen to his opinion of where the 
child's best interests lie. 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 2993. 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (empha-
sis added). Some courts and commentators 
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The statute which plaintiff seeks to chal-
lenge under due process and equal protec-
tion provides that the father of an illegit-
imate child conclusively is presumed to 
have abandoned his child if he fails to file a 
claim of paternity and notice of willingness 
to support the child prior to the time the 
child is placed by the mother with a li-
censed adoption agency, or prior to the 
time a petition is filed by a person with 
whom the mother has placed the child for 
adoption.3 Trie state action question is 
whether termination of plaintiffs parental 
rights by operation of the above statute 
implicates the actors in a private adoption 
to the extent that they may be considered 
to be state actors for the purpose of testing 
whether plaintiff's parental rights were 
constitutionally terminated. This court is 
persuaded that the statute has such an 
effect. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 
(1982) the Supreme Court delineated a two-
step inquiry in resolving the issue of state 
action: 
First, the deprivation must be caused by 
the exercise of some right or privilege 
created by the Stat:- or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by the State or by a 
person for whom the State is respon-
sible Second, the party charged 
with the deprivation must be a person 
have determined that the potential interest rec-
ognized in Lehr may require greater constitu-
tional protection if it is asserted, as in this case, 
at or near the time of birth rather than after a 
significant lapse of time as in Lehr. See In re 
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 
S.E.2d 459 (1987); In re Baby Girl M, 37 Cal.3d 
65, 207 Cal.Rptr. 309, 68S P.2d 918, 924 (1984); 
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of 
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robert-
son, AS Ohio St.L.Rev. 313, 351-371 (1984). 
That question need not be resolved in analyzing 
state action. It should be noted, however, that 
the liberty interest asserted here is subject to the 
lesser protection of Lehr as an opportunity to 
develop a relationship with the child, rather 
than non-interruption of an existing relation-
ship. 
3. The statute reads in relevant part: 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of each living parent having rights in 
relation to said child 
(3)(a) A person who is the father or claims to 
be the father of an illegitimate child may 
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who may fairly be said to be a state 
actor. 
Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. There can 
be no question but that under Utah's statu-
tory scheme the first part of the Lugar 
test is met. "Undoubtedly the State was 
responsible for the statute." Lugar, 457 
U.S. at 938, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. Since the 
first test is met, this court must determine 
whether operation of the statute in this 
case implicates defendants L.D.S. Social 
Services and the prospective adoptive par-
ents to a degree whereby they "may fairly 
be said to be state actor[s]." Id. at 937, 
102 S.Ct at 2754. 
[1] In focusing on the second determi-
nation, there is a critical distinction in the 
operation of the above statute as compared 
with many other state laws which may be 
invoked by private parties. Here, the stat-
ute involved is self-operative and man-
dates the resultant termination of an ille-
gitimate father's parental rights. The 
State of Utah, not a private party, has 
made an official policy decision that any-
time custody of an illegitimate child is re-
linquished by the mother, the father's pa-
rental rights will be automatically cut off 
unless a notice of paternity previously has 
been filed by the biological father. That 
state decision to terminate the father's pa-
claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the 
child by registering with the registrar of vital 
statistics in the department of health, a notice 
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate 
child and of his willingness and intent to 
support the child to the best of his ability 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the 
birth of the child but must be registered prior 
to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished 
or placed with an agency licensed to provide 
adoption services or prior to the filing of a 
petition by a person with whom the mother 
has placed the child for adoption 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file 
and register his notice of claim to paternity 
and his agreement to support the child shall 
be barred from thereafter bringing or main-
taining any action to establish his paternity of 
the child. Such failure shall further constitute 
an abandonment of said child and a waiver 
and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the 
adoption of said child, and the consent of such 
father to the adoption of such child shall not 
be required. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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rental rights is implemented through the 
actor or actors who accept the child for 
placement, whether a state entity, a private 
licensed adoption agency, or any other per-
son, for example an attorney. It would be 
a total fiction to allow the state to remove 
itself from its decision to cut off parental 
rights simply because a private party trig-
gers operation of the statute. The only 
fair conclusion is that such a private party 
becomes a "state actor" when his or her 
actions bring the statute into play so as to 
effectuate the pre-determined state deci-
sion to terminate parental rights. 
This is not a case wherein state action 
could be found because the legislation en-
couraged a private decision to discrimi-
nate.4 Also, it is not a case wherein the 
decision of a private party to discriminate 
based upon race or sex amounts to a state 
decision because the private actor has some 
"state" attributes or connection, such as 
state funding or regulation.5 This case is 
also distinguishable from the slippery slope 
of private dispute resolution whereby a pri-
vate party makes necessary use oi some 
state procedure and thereafter is chal-
lenged as a "state actor*' for having de-
prived a plaintiff of liberty or property 
based upon the state's involvement in cre-
4. Defendants have cited several cases for the 
proposition that when a private party acts pur-
suant to a state law, there is stale action only if 
the state law authorizes conduct that was imper-
missible prior to the enactment. For example 
in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 
1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967) the Supreme Court 
determined that an amendment to the Califor-
nia constitution permitting private discrimina-
tion in real estate transactions, which was previ-
ously prohibited by statute, constituted an offi-
cial encouragement to the private decision to 
discriminate, thereby transforming such private 
decisions into state action. However, Reitman, 
and the cases cited by defendants deal with a 
completely different situation than is presented 
here. In those cases the question was whether a 
private decision may be attributed to the State 
because it was encouraged by a state statute. 
Here the statute in question increased rather 
than decreased the rights of putative fathers 
over what was recognized at common law. Ac-
cordingly, that statute would seem to have no 
impact upon determination of the "state actor" 
question. 
5. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 VS. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); 
ating such procedure or in failing to create 
other procedures. State action may not be 
present in the categories of cases just men-
tioned because in those cases private par-
ties, rather than the state, made the essen-
tial decision to attempt to deprive a plain-
tiff of his or her liberty or property inter-
est.6 
Another consideration which comes into 
play in determining whether state action is 
present is the distinction between property 
interests and liberty interests. Unlike dis-
putes involving property in which private 
parties may agree to some allocation or 
disposition without any state involvement, 
oftentimes the liberty interest can only be 
severed by the state. The distinction is 
apparent in child custody-parental right 
cases. Although a private party may de-
prive a parent of physical custody of his 
child, only the state can irrevocably severe 
all parental rights, which rights are recog-
nized as being "far more previous than 
property rights."7 
This court considers that under the cir-
cumstances of this case the conduct by 
private actors amounted to state action. 
This conclusion follows from consideration 
of the evident state mandated decision set 
see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 
2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 VS. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1982). 
6. Compare, Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436 
VS. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); 
(no state action present) with Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 
73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (state action present). 
7. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 102 
S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The 
Supreme Court said of the state's power to ter-
minate parental rights: 
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the need for 
multiple citation" that a natural parent's "de-
sire for and right to 'the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her chil-
dren'" is an interest far more precious than 
any property right . . . when the state initiates 
a parental rights termination proceeding, it 
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental 
liberty interest, but to end i t . . . . Few forms 
of state action are both so severe and so irre-
versible. 
Id. at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 (emphasis add-
ed); see also discussion at footnote 2, supra. 
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forth in the self operative statute, and is 
supported by several factually specific 
"tests" of the Supreme Court. Perhaps 
most readily applicable is the "public func-
tion" test.8 In Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct 449, 42 
L Ed 2d 477 (1974) the Court dealt with an 
individual decision by a privately owned 
utility company to terminate a plaintiffs 
utility service without notice and hearing. 
In Jackson the court stated: 
Petitioner next urges that state action is 
present because respondent provides an 
essential public service required to be 
supplied on a reasonably continuous ba-
sis . . . and hence performs a "public 
function." We have, of course, found 
state action present in the exercise by a 
private entity of powers traditionary ex-
clusively reserved to the State. .. If 
we were dealing with the exercise by 
Metropolitan of some power delegated to 
it by the State which is traditionally 
associated with sovereignty, such as 
eminent domain, our case would be 
quite a different one. 
8. In Lugar the court commented on its prior 
"tests" for attributing state action to otherwise 
private actors 
[The] "something more" which would convert 
the private party into a state action might 
vary with the circumstances of the case 
[TJhe court has articulated a number of dif-
ferent factors or tests in different contexts 
e g , the "public function" test .; the "state 
compulsion" test . , the "nexus" test , 
and, in the case of prejudgment attachments a 
"joint action test" Whether these different 
tests arc actually different in operation or 
simply different ways of characterizing the 
necessanl> fact-bound inquiry that confronts 
the court in such a Situation need not be 
resolved here 
Although this court relies on the public function 
test, that reliance is not to the exclusion of the 
other Supreme Court tests. It is just that within 
these facts the other tests seem to be encom-
passed by the public function test Neverthe-
less, the extensive regulation of private agencies 
by Family Services also could be considered to 
establish a sufficient "nexus" "State compul-
sion" and/or "joint actions" may also exist in 
that the Utah statute "encourages" and "autho-
rizes" the resultant termination of parental 
rights when the private adoption agency choos-
es to take custody of the child Also, a symbiot-
ic relationship exists between pnvate agencies 
and the state because as defendants concede the 
private agencies reduce the cost that would ncc 
essarily have to be born by the st«itc to place 
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419 U.S. at 352-53, 95 S.Ct at 454 (empha-
sis added). In this case we are dealing 
with a traditional function of the state. 
This case involves the principle of parens 
patriae (parent of the country) whereby 
the sovereign is under the duty to act as 
guardian for those under legal disability. 
The State of Utah has an exclusive and 
traditional duty to assure that a child 
whose custody has been released to the 
state by the natural mother will be placed 
in the care of appropriate substitute par-
ents. Although traditionally many pnvate 
actors and family members voluntarily 
have stepped into parental roles when natu-
ral parents have suffered a disability, that 
voluntary conduct was not the result of a 
legal duty The State of Utah is the sole 
party with such duty. In furtherance of 
that duty the state has undertaken to fulfill 
its responsibility by automatic termination 
of a father's parental rights, which is a 
prerequisite to any adoption,9 and delega-
tion of some of its responsibility to private 
regulated adoption agencies in finding ap-
propriate substitute parents.10 
children if the pnvate entities were not engaged 
in that function 
9. See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 
§ 18 1 at 602 (1968) (adoption requires that the 
legal rights and obligations of natural parents 
Come to an end before similar rights and obli-
gations can be vested in new adoptive parents) 
10* Under Utah's statutory scheme, Family Ser-
vices statutorily is required to prescribe rules 
and regulations for the manner in which private 
adoptive agencies arc organized financed and 
administrated Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-4 
(1986) Specifically Family Services prescribes 
Standards for the employment and performance 
Of private adoption agency employees Family 
Services also writes rules and regulations cover-
ing the general standards of practice, the 
records required to be kept, the use of homes to 
receive and care for children received by the 
agency and "any other matters deemed neces-
sary to assure the competency and suitability of 
Child placing agencies to place children " Id. 
Family Services is required to investigate all 
applicants for child placing agency status 
| 55-8a-2 In addition, Family Services is also 
granted the authority to conduct investigations 
into agency compliance with its regulations 
Once a license has been issued Finally, the 
Statute authorizes Family Services to hold li-
cense revocation or suspension proceedings 
Upon notice § 55-8a-3 
l U l t 
The conclusion we reach here that state 
action is present should not create a chill 
upon actions of private adoption agencies. 
This court does not rule that all actions and 
decisions by private adoption agencies will 
be subject to review under the constitution. 
Rather this court's holding is limited to the 
role of LDS Social Services and other pri-
vate parties in triggering the state mandat-
ed result of § 7&-30-4.11 Where as here 
that role is limited as a conduit for the 
implementation of prior state decisions and 
policy it seems clear that no liability for 
damages could attach. 
[2] A final question is whether the ab-
sence of the state or some official thereof 
as a named party presents a defect here. 
We think not. The private parties and the 
named state judge are the only parties 
from whom requested injunctive relief 
could be obtained if the statute were to be 
declared unconstitutional.12 In focusing 
upon the conduct that resulted in termi-
11. Accordingly, this court makes no finding of 
state action with regard to plaintiffs claim for 
damages against LDS Social Services. This 
court's holding is limited to operation of the 
statute and the plaintiffs request for return of 
custody. Thai recognition is consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's dicta in Sanchez v. LD.S. 
Soda! Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (Utah 
1984) that a decision by L.D.S. Social Services 
not to inform a putative father of his duty under 
§ 78-30-4 is not state action as well as the 
dissent in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 
P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J. dissent-
ing) that deception by the mother or other pri-
vate parties as to when a child would be born is 
not state action. See abo In the Matter of Peti-
tion of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942, 
947 (1986) (deception of mother as to child's 
custody was not state action). 
12. It would be of little benefit to name state 
officers such as the attorney general because 
operation of the statute seemingly has no rela-
tionship to the responsibilities of such officials. 
13. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 
681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) (suit against private 
nonprofit adoption agency and the child's moth-
er; reference in the editor's case summary to 
the defendant as a "state adoption agency" is 
incorrect); Sanchez v. LD.S. Social Services, 
680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) (suil against private 
nonprofit adoption agency); Ellis v. Social Ser-
vices Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) 
(suit against private nonprofit adoption agency 
and the child's mother). See also In re Adoption 
nation of plaintiffs parental rights, only 
three principal actors are involved: (1) the 
child's mother who relinquished all custody 
and control of the child; (2) LDS Social 
Services who received custody of the child, 
took applications from potential adoptive 
parents and delivered custody to the adop-
tive parents; and (3) John and Jane Doe 
who applied for adoption and received cus-
tody of the child from LDS Social Services. 
This court holds that in a judicial proceed-
ing by a putative father for determination 
of his parental rights, the said actors 
should be deemed to be state actors for the 
limited purpose of challenging operation of 
the statute. The Utah Supreme Court ap-
pears to agree and implicitly has recog-
nized that operation of § 78-30-4 involves 
state action in the context of a private 
adoption, even when the state or its offi-
cials are not formally joined as parties.13 
A similar recognition is found in cases from 
other jurisdictions and the United States 
Supreme Court.14 In addition, it is clear 
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) 
(allowing intervention by putative father in 
adoption proceeding to raise constitutionality of 
statute under Federal and State Constitutions); 
In the Matter of K.B.E. and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292 
(Utah Ct.App.1987) (same). 
14. See In re Adoption of Martz. 102 Misc.2d 1C2, 
423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), aff'd, In re Ad'i prion of 
Jessica "XX", 11 A.D.2d 381. 434 N.Y.S.Id 772 
(1980), aff'd. 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 
430 N.E.2d 896 (1981), aff'd, Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 
(1983). In Lehr the State of New York was 
allowed to intervene as a party but its presence 
seemingly was not a factor in finding that the 
conduct involved state action which could be 
tested in that particular lawsuit. If the state's 
ability to present argument is a factor in deter-
mining whether state action exists in this partic-
ular lawsuit, local rule of practice 6(b) is impor-
tant because the State of Utah has been notified 
of the challenge to the statute here. At this 
point the state has not sought intervention. See 
also In re David Andrew, 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 
N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd, In re David A.C, 43 N.Y.2d 
708, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208, 372 N.E.2d 42 (1977), 
rev'd, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 
S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (appeal from 
adoption proceeding involving father and adop-
tive parents); In re: Application of Randall Wal-
cott for Adoption of Child, Adoption Case No. 
8466, (Ga.Super.Ct. July 12, 1976), aff'd, 238 Ga. 
230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), aff'd, Quilloin v. 
Walcotl, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 LEd.2d 
511 (1978) (appeal from adoption proceeding 
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that the requirement of state action is the 
same whether a case is brought m federal 
or state court,5 We conclude that plaintiff 
has named the proper parties to test the 
constitutionality of the alleged "state" dep-
rivation, 
II. Abstention 
Defendants have requested that if this 
court finds jurisdiction to exist, neverthe-
less it should abstain from hearing the case 
and defer to the ongoing state adoption 
proceedmg. In Colorado River Water 
Consenatxon District v United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 96 S Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 
(1976) the Supreme Court reviewed its prior 
cases and discussed the propriety of ab-
stention The court said: 
Abstention from the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. 
"The doctrine of abstention, under which 
a District Court may decline to exercise 
or postpone the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion, is an extraordinary and narrow ex-
ception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before 
it Abdication of the obligation to decide 
cases can be justified under this doctrine 
only in the exceptional circumstances 
where the orde*- to the parties to repair 
invoking father and adoptive parents) In Quil> 
lion the state appeared as amicus curiae before 
the Georgia Supreme Coun See also In re the 
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga 292, 358 
S E 2d 459 (1987) In Eason the putative father 
f Jed a petition for legitimation of his biological 
child which was objected to by the child s moth 
er, a child placement agency and prospective 
adoptive parents The Georgia Supreme Court 
reached the federal constitutional question 
raised 2nd $2)6 
But the relation TC between adopting 
parents and chik J*d not take place in the 
absence of state participation The adoption 
laws were being pursued through the courts 
and this accounts for the placement of the 
child with the adopting parents The unwed 
father has a constitutionally protected interest 
which cannot be denied him through state 
action Only the state can alter us decision to 
prevent the development of a parent child re 
lationship with adopting parents until the 
unwed father's rights are resolved Thus we 
conclude if Scharlach has not abandoned his 
opportunity interest, the standard which must 
be used to determine his right to legitimate 
the child is his fitness as a parent to have 
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to the state court would clearly serve an 
important countervailing interest.'* . . . 
Our decisions have confined the circum-
stances appropriate for abstention to 
three several categories. 
(a) Abstention is appropriate "m cases 
presenting a federal constitutional issue 
which might be mooted or presented m a 
different posture by a state court deter-
mination of pertinent state law." 
[Texas v. Pullman Co, 312 U S. 496, 61 
S.Ct 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)] 
(b) Abstention is also appropriate 
whsre there have been presented diffi-
cult questions of state law bearing on 
policy problems of substantial public im-
pact whose importance transcends the 
result in the case at bar. . . . [Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 
360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 
(1959)] 
(c) Finally; abstention is appropriate 
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or 
a patently invalid state statute, federal 
jurisdiction has been invoked for th. pur-
pose of restraining state cnminal pro-
ceedings, Younger [v. Harms, 401 U.S. 
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ld 2- 669 (1971)] 
. . . state nuisance proceedings ante-
cedent to a criminal prosecution, \vhich 
custody of the child If he is fit he must 
prevail. 
The court remanded for a factual determination 
involving the previously joined parties See also 
In the Matter of the Petition of Ste\e BD, 112 
Idaho 22, 730 PJd 942 (1986) (proceeding in-
volving the prospective adoptive parents and 
natural father; court reached federal constitu-
tional question) 
15. In Lugar the United States Supreme Court 
said 
If fc defendant debtor in state-court debt col-
lection proceedings can successfully chal 
lenge, on federal due process grounds, the 
plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures 
authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to 
understand whv that same behavior by the 
state-court plaintiff should not provide a 
cause of action under § 1983 If the creditor-
plaintiff violates the debtor defendant s due 
process rights by seizing his propert) in ac 
cordance with statutory procedures, there is 
lutlc or no reason to den> to the latter a cause 
of action under the federal statute, § 1983 
designed to provide judicial redress for just 
such constitutional violations 
457 U.S at 934, 102 S Ct at 2752 
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are directed at obtaining the closure of 
places exhibiting obscene films, Huff-
man [v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 
S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975)] . . . or 
collection of state taxes. 
Id. at 813-816, 96 S.Ct. at 1244-46. 
[3] After careful consideration, this 
court has determined that it is appropriate 
to exercise discretion by requiring resolu-
tion by the state courts of the questions 
here presented This court is persuaded 
that this case falls within one or more of 
the exceptions explained in Colorado River 
Water Conservation District as well as 
the longstanding practice of abstention in 
domestic relations matters. 
A. Pullman Abstention 
With regard to the category of absten-
tion involving possible mooting of the fed-
eral constitutional question, the Utah Su-
preme Court's opinion in Wells v. Chil-
dren 's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984) is important. In that case the 
Utah court reviewed the Supreme Court's 
opinions in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) 
and in Le.urv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 77 LEd2d 614 (1983). The 
court then turned to the Utah Constitution 
and determined that under the Utah Consti-
tution a putative father receives greater 
protection than was granted by the Su-
preme Court in Lehr under the federal 
constitution. Id. 681 P.2d at 206. Based 
upon that recognition plaintiff may be able 
to establish that as applied the Utah stat-
ute is violative of the greater protections of 
the state constitution, thereby mooting the 
federal constitutional question. 
B. Thibodaux Abstention 
This case also presents important ques-
tions of state law that bear upon policy 
issues of considerable importance to the 
State of Utah. The importance of the state 
interests in this case are born out by early 
16. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 
689 (Utah 1986), Wells v. Children's Aid Society 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984). Sanchez 
v. LD S Social Sendees, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 
1984), Ellis v. Social Services Dept. of the 
Supreme Court precedent dealing with the 
jurisdiction of federal district courts. In In 
re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 
L.Ed. 500 (1890) the court said: 
The whole subject of the domestic rela 
tions of husband and wife, parent and 
child, belongs to the laws of the States 
and not to the laws of the United States 
As to the right to the control and posses-
sion of this child, as it is contested by its 
father and its grandfather, it is one in 
regard to which neither the Congress of 
the United States nor any authority of 
the United States has any special juris 
diction. 
Id. at 593-94, 10 S.Ct. at 853. Later au-
thority has recognized that the theoretical 
underpinnings of such Supreme Court rec-
ognition is not complete lack of jurisdiction 
but rather strong policies of federal-state 
comity. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 
F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir.1978). Accordingly, 
federal courts ordinarily should defer to 
the state courts based upon the state's 
strong interest in domestic relations mat-
ters, the superior expertise of state courts 
in settling such disputes and the possibility 
of incompatible state and federal orders 
See Fay v. South Colonie Central School 
DisL, 802 F.2d 21, 31 (2nd Cir 1986), Peter-
son v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir 
1983), Magaziner v M^ntemuro, 46S F2d 
782, 787 (3rd Cir.1972) Based upon the 
above policies, courts have been reluctant 
to get into custody disputes wherein pri-
vate parties contest what is in the best 
interest of a child. See Coats v Woods, 
819 F2d 236, 237 (9th Cir 1987); Peterson 
v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir 19S3); 
LaMontagne v. LaMontagne, 394 F.Supp 
1159, 1160 (D.Mass.1975) 
Admittedly this case goes beyond a mere 
private dispute over the best interests of a 
child and goes to the heart of Utah's statu-
tory scheme. Plaintiff correctly points out 
that the Utah Supreme Court has upheld 
the facial validity of § 78-30-4.1* How-
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 
P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980) Plaintiff here con 
tends that the most recent opinion, In re Adop-
tion of Baby Boy Doe, so si uficantl} alters the 
operation of the statute that it amounts to a 
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ever, the Supreme Court of Utah has de- The final concern prompted by broad fa-
fined an "impossibility" exception to the cial attacks on state statutes is the 
statute, and there is considerable reason to threat to our federal system of govern-
believe the Utah courts are interpreting ment posed by "the needless obstruction 
§ 78-30-4 in a way that will meet the fed- to the domestic policy of the states by 
eral constitutional questions raised here.17 forestalling state action in construing 
The state's interests at stake here> are and applying its own statutes." 
great, and the Utah courts have evidenced 
a willingness to balance the interests of 
putative fathers in individual cases within State courts are the principal expositors 
the purview of a constitutional statute. of state law. Almost every constitu-
This court considers that the Utah courts tional challenge—-and particularly one 
they ought to be given further opportunity as far ranging as that involved in this 
to do so. In Moore v Sims, 442 U S 415, case—offers the opportunity for nar-
99 SCt 2371, 60 LEd.2d 994 (1979) the rowing constructions that might obvi-
Supnjme Court recognized as much. ate the constitutional problem and in-
facial attack on the statute. At least one com-
mentator agrees See Note, Termination of an 
Un^ed Fathers Parental Rights, 1987 Utah 
L Re\ 220, 221 For other commentary on the 
In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe case see L 
Wardle, The Adoption Conundrum Part I, 1987 
Utah Lawyer Alert No 4 at 4-8, L Wardle, The 
Adoption Conundrum Part II, 1987 Utah Lawyer 
Alert No 5 at 6-9, Note, The Putatne Fathers' 
Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing In 
re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B Y U L.Re\ 1081. 
17. In Ellis the Utah Supreme Court first defined 
an impossibility exceptio u r - *- § 78-30-4. 
The court said that if it was "impossible for the 
father to file the required notice of paternity 
prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his 
own and he came forward w» hm a reason-
able time after the baby's birth he should be 
deemed to have complied with the statute " 615 
F 2d at 1256 (emphasis added) In its most 
recent interpretation of the impossibilitv excep-
tion the Supreme Court overruled a specific 
finding of fact by the trial court that it was not 
"impossible" for the father to have complied 
with § 78-30-4 In so doing the court engaged 
in a factually specific analysis of the operation 
of the statute in terms of fairness to the particu-
lar father involved. The Utah Supreme Court 
said 
[T]he standards enunciated in [our] cases 
were developed in recognition of the need to 
balance the competing interests in this type of 
case, the significant state interest in speedily 
placing infants for adoption and the constitu-
tionally protected rights of putative fathers 
See Wells, 681 P.2d at 202-03. In all but the 
most exceptional cases, the operation of sec-
tion 78-3-04 achieves that balance as it af 
fords putative fathers the opportunity to as-
sert and protect their rights while providing a 
finite point at which the state's interest super-
cedes that of the father However, where a 
father docs not know of the need to protect 
his rights, there is no "reasonable opportuni 
ty" to assert or protect parental rights In 
such a case, the operation of the statute fails 
to achieve the desired balance and raises seri-
ous due process concerns Although we have 
previously established that actual notice is not 
required prior to termination of parental 
rights under section 7&-3Q-4(3), Wells, 681 
P.2d at 207, that determination was based at 
least in part on the assumption that "[n]otice 
requirements ma\ be satisfied when necessar-
ily implied/' Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256, n 16 
(citation omitted), 1 e , in the usual case where 
the putative father knows or should know of 
the birth and can reasonably take the timely 
action required to avoid the statutory bar. 
Under the circumstances of this case, how-
ever, including the clearly articulated intent 
of the father to keep and rear the child, the 
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all 
involved, the representations made b> the 
mother, the actions of her famil>, the prema-
ture birth, and the non-residency of the father 
coupled with his absence at the time of birth 
we cannot say that this was either a usual 
case or that notice mav be implied We there 
fore conclude that appellant has successfully 
shown "that the termination of his parental 
rights was contrary to basic notions of due 
process, and that he came forward within a 
reasonable time after the baby's birth, [such 
that] he should be deemed to have complied 
with the statute " In re Adoption of Baby Boy 
Doe, 111 P.2d at 691 
In an even more recent opinion the Utah Court 
of Appeals found a remand unnecessary to de-
termine impossibility where a putative father 
filed a notice of paternity hours after a petition 
for adoption was filed The court acknowl-
edged that the father failed timely to file in 
accordance with the statute but held that in the 
circumstances application of the statute's bar 
would violate fundamental fairness In the 
Matter of K.B.E and T M E, 740 P.2d 292, 296-
97 (Utah Ct App 1987) The court engaged in a 
balancing analysis apparently independent of a 
determination of impossibility. 
tclligcntly mediate federal constitu-
tional concerns and state interest. 
When federal courts disrupt that process 
of mediation while interjecting them-
selves in such disputes, they prevent the 
informed evolution of state policy by 
state tribunals The price exacted in 
terms of comity would only be out-
weighed if state courts were not compe-
tent to adjudicate federal constitutional 
claims—a postulate we have repeatedly 
and emphatically rejected. 
In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is 
whether the state proceedings afford an 
adequate opportunity to raise the consti-
tutional claims and Texas law appears to 
raise no procedural barriers. 
Id. at 430, 99 S.Ct. at 2380-81. 
Under all of the circumstances this court 
is persuaded that under the doctrine of 
Thibodaux it should defer to the state 
courts to allow them to fulfill their duty to 
further Utah's policy in balancing the com-
peting interests in adoption cases consist-
ent with federal constitutional principles. 
C. Younger Abstention 
Under the Younger abstention doctrine a 
ftderal court will not grant injunctive or 
u,claratory relief if the federal plaintiff is 
a party to a state criminal proceeding and 
the party can raise the constitutional issue 
in the state proceeding. Younger has been 
extended by the Supreme Court to civil 
contexts when the state is a party to a civil 
proceeding and the action is in aid of and 
closely related to criminal statutes. Sec 
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 
18. Some courts do not require that the State be 
a direct part> so long as significant state inter-
ests are involved Under that view the state 
adoption proceeding would seem to meet the 
test This is an unsettled area of the lau, how-
ever. See Ethn v Robb, 458 U.S 1112, 102 S.Ct. 
3496, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1962) (White, J dissent-
mg from denial of certiorari, joined by Bren-
nan, J. on basis that whether Younger applies to 
a private dispute (in Robb a custody dispute) is 
a question that needs to be finally resolved by 
the Supreme Court). 
19. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 
686 (Utah 1986), Ellis v. Social Ser\'iccs of the 
60 L Ed.2d 994 (1979; (involving state slat 
ute authorizing temporary removal of child 
in child abuse context). In this case plain 
tiff seeks to enjoin the ongoing adoption 
proceeding and thus Younger fs recognized 
policy of noninterference applies. How-
ever, application of Younger to the facts of 
this case would require extension of the 
principle in two respects: (1) here the plain-
tiff in the federal proceeding is not a party 
to the ongoing adoption proceeding; and (2i 
the State of Utah is not a directly named 
party in the adoption proceeding.18 Ac-
cordingly, this court finds it unnecessary to 
rely on Younger abstention because we 
have found that Thibodaux abstention here 
applies. 
Despite nonreliance on Younger, this 
court recognizes that for any principle *' 
abstention to apply it is necessary that the 
plaintiff have an avenue available in state 
court. In this case the statute, § 78-3Q-4 
provides that plaintiff's failure to file a 
notice of paternity prior to the time his 
child was placed with L.D.S Social Services 
bars him "from thereafter bringing or 
maintaining any action to establish his pa 
ternity of the child." However, defendants 
point out that through intervention in the 
adoption proceeding or through filing a ha 
beas corpus petition putative fathers have 
obtained state court review of the constitu 
tionality of § 78-30-4 as applied to them » 
The court also notes that ultimate recourse 
to federal court from an adverse state 
court decision is not cut off20 In a!! 
events, this court in finding abstention to 
be appropriate assumes that plaintiff will 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), In the Matter of KBE 
and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah CLApp 19S7) 
20. If plaintiff challenges § 78-30-4 in state 
court and the court upholds the statute, plaintiff 
will have a right of appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court See 28 U.S C § 1257(2). The 
Court's appellate jurisdiction is nondiscretion 
ary although the Court need not give the case 
plenary review See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U S 
332. 343-44, 95 S Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 LEd 2d 223 
(1975). 
1549 CONN. SAV. BANK v. SAVERS FEDERAL SAW & LOAN 
Cite u 670 JFSupp. 1349 (S.D.Fla. 1987) 
third-party claim against appraisers, and 
appraisers removed action from state to 
federal district court. Original plaintiffs 
and third-party plaintiffs moved to remand. 
The District Court, Aronovitz, J., held that 
third-party action was improvidently re-
moved. 
have an adequate opportunity for review in 
state court.21 
Based upon the above analysis, plaintiffs 
motion for preliminary injunction is denied 
and defendant's Motion to Dismiss is grant-
ed without prejudice to resolution of the 
matter in the state courts of Utah. This 
Memorandum Decision and Order will suf 
fice as the court's final action on this mo-
tion; no further Order need be prepared by 
counsel. 
Motion granted. 
CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK, Heri-
tage Savings and Loan Association, 
et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION and Cushman 
and Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. 
a/k/a Cushman and Wakefield Ap-
praisal Division, Defendants. 
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CI1 Y FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION and Cushman and 
Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. a/k/a 
Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Di-
vision, Third-Party Defendants. 
No. 86-12002-Civ. 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida, 
Miami Division. 
April 16, 1987. 
Action was brought against permanent 
financiers for their alleged breach of loan 
purchase agreement. Financiers filed 
21. If after diligent effort b\ plaintiff, and coop-
eration from the defendants, plaintiff is unable 
to obtain review in the state courts of Utah this 
court will be required to exercise i s junsdic-
1 Removal of Cases e=>56 
Under removal statute, third-party 
claim is "separate and independent" from 
claims raised in main action if it is suscepti-
ble of adjudication separate and apart from 
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1441(c). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Removal of Cases <s=56 
Third-party action filed by permanent 
financiers against appraisers allegedly re-
sponsible for financier's breach of loan pur-
chase agreement was improvidently re-
moved to federal district court; financiers' 
third-party claims were not "separate and 
independent" from breach of contract 
claims raised in main action. 2S U.S.C.A. 
§ 1441(c). 
Alice Blackwell White, Broad and Cassel, 
Maitland, Fla., O.H. Storey, III, Hoover. 
Jacobs & Storey, Little Rock, Ark., Robert 
E. Doyle, Asbell, Hains, Doyle & Pick-
worth, Naples, Fla., for Savers Federal 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 
Leigh E. Dunston, Gunster, Yoakley, 
Criser & Stewart, P.A.. West Palm Beach, 
Fla., George Vega, Jr., Vega, Brown, Nich-
ols, Stanley & Martin, Naples, Fla., for City 
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 
Leo J. Salvatori, Quarles & Brady, Na-
ples, Fla., Gary R. Battistoni, Drinker, Bid-
die & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for Solamar 
Venture, Ltd. 
tion See Louisiana Power & Light Co v. Thibo> 
daux, 360 U.S 25, 30-31, 79 S Ct 1070, 3 
L.Ld.2d 1058 (1959). 
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In the Matter of the Adoption of 
T.R.F., a Minor, 
• . 
Raj FELAN, Appellant 
No. 870307-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 30, 1988. 
Natural father appealed from order of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J., terminating father's 
parental rights and authorizing nonrelated 
third parties to proceed with adoption of 
child. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that (1) father had acknowledged 
child as his own and thereby legitimated 
child; (2) father was not required to file 
notice of paternity; and (3) termination of 
father's parental rights was unconstitution-
al. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*=»12 
To legitimate child, acknowledgment 
statute requires unwed father to publicly 
acknowledge child, receive child into fa-
ther's family and treat child as legitimate. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-12. 
2. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*=>12 
Natural father had "acknowledged his 
child" and thereby "legitimated child" pur-
suant to acknowledgment statute before 
petition for adoption was filed, where fa-
ther received chOd into his home for brief 
visits and on an occasion child would spend 
night, father temporarily resided with child 
and child's mother, and when possible, fa-
ther visited the child at child's mothers 
home, took child to Texas to meet his own 
family, and held child out to public and to 
his family as his own. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-
12. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Adoption «=»7.2(1) 
Any filing of petition for adoption af-
ter unwed father has acknowledged child 
and only natural mother has consented to 
adoption is legal nullity. 
4. Children Out-of-Wedlock *»12 
To maintain his paternal right estab-
lished by compliance with express terms of 
acknowledgment statute, natural father 
was not required, in addition, to file notice 
of paternity. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4(3Xb), 
78-30-12. 
5. Infants «=>155, 156, 157 
Parental rights cannot be terminated 
by merely applying best interests of child 
standard, but rather, there must be show-
ing of parent's unfitness, abandonment, or 
substantial neglect 
6. Constitutional Law <*=>274(5) 
Infants <*=»155 
Depriving natural father of his paren-
tal rights based upon best interest of child 
despite fact that father was found to have 
relationship with child and to be fit and 
proper parent, was unconstitutional viola-
tion of father's due process rights. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
Jane Allen (argued), Salt Lake City, for 
appellant 
Bart J. Bailey (argued), Bailey & Nelson, 
Midvale, for T.R.F. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
DAVIDSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
This is an appeal from an order which 
permanently terminated appellant Ray Fel-
an's parental nghts and authorized the pe-
titioners to proceed with the adoption of his 
child. The trial court found that Felan, 
prior to the fihng of petitioners' petition for 
adoption, had adopted his child by acknowl-
edgment pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78-30-12 (1987), and that he was a fit 
and proper person to have custody of his 
child. Nevertheless, the trial court perma-
nently terminated Felan's parental rights. 
The court based its decision on Felan's 
T.RJ. v. FELAN 
Cite as 760 VJd 906 (UuhApp. 1988) 
Utah 907 
failure to file a notice of paternity under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3<M(3Xb) (1987), be-
fore the petitioners filed their petition for 
adoption, and on the "best interests" of the 
child. We reverse and remand. 
Appellate review of a trial court's termi-
nation of parental rights is highly fact sen-
sitive. Consequently, we review the facts 
of this dispute in detail. Felan's child was 
born on October 30,1980, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Felan was stationed in Japan with 
the United States Marine Corps at the time 
of the child's birth. Felan and the child's 
mother were not married at the time of 
conception, nor did they marry after the 
child's birth. Felan is named as the child's 
father on the birth certificate and the child 
was given his surname. He is also identi-
fied as the child's father on the child's 
baptismal record. 
Felan and the child's mother discussed 
marriage and having a child before the 
child was conceived. However, Felan at 
the time was married to another woman.1 
Felan purchased baby furniture for his 
child, including a crib, a playpen, a high-
chair, a rocker, and clothing, costing rough-
ly $1200. When the child was about six-
weeks old, the child's mother took the child 
to visit Felan in Japan for approximately 
two weeks. Felan and the child's mother 
remained in contact during his stay in Ja-
pan. When the child was one and one-half 
years of age, Felan was transferred to 
Twenty-nine Palms, California. While sta-
tioned at Twenty-nine Palms, according to 
the child's mother, "[Felan] would come [to 
Salt Lake City] often or I would go down 
there." The child's mother's job entailed 
traveling and she worked in Anaheim, Cali-
fornia "a couple of times so that [Felan] 
could see [the child] and we could be to-
gether." During one of these visits, Felan 
had the child by himself for roughly a week 
while the mother attended business meet-
ings. According to Felan, the relationship 
he had with the child's mother was like any 
other "military family." That is, they 
would see each other when they could, 
planning visits around where Felan was 
stationed. After his term in Twenty-nine 
Palms, Felan was discharged from the mili-
tary after twenty-three and one-half years 
of service. 
In August 1983, after he was discharged, 
Felan returned to Salt Lake City where he 
resided with the child's mother and the 
child until December 1983. Thereafter, he 
moved to Austin, Texas where his parents 
and other relatives lived, to seek employ-
ment The child's mother and the child 
went to visit Felan in Austin to celebrate 
the child's third birthday. It was impor-
tant to both Felan and the child's mother 
that the child know Felan's relatives. 
In January 1984, Felan accepted a posi-
tion with the United States Postal Service 
and returned to Salt Lake City. Felan 
lived with the child's mother and their child 
from the end of January 1984 until May 
1984 in the mother's rented house. There-
after, Felan put a $15,000 down payment 
on a house where the child's mother, their 
child, and her other children resided. After 
Felan allegedly physically and emotionally 
abused the child's mother, the couple's rela-
tionship deteriorated. In December 1984 
the mother, along with all of her children, 
moved out of Felan's home. 
It is unclear from the record how often 
Felan visited his child after his separation 
from the mother. At first, the child's 
mother admits she did not tell Felan where 
she lived. Felan claims he accidentally dis-
covered the residence of his child. Felan 
claims he thereafter saw the child's mother 
on a regular basis. Eventually he stopped 
seeing the mother, but he continued to see 
the child. According to the child's mother, 
Felan visited the child twice a month for 
two to three hours each time, and occasion-
ally he would take the child on overnight 
visits to his home. Felan also took the 
child on extended trips by himself. For 
example, he took the child to Texas on two 
occasions and once took her to Las Vegas. 
Indeed, Felan took the child to visit his 
family in Texas for 22 days in August 1985, 
just five months before the petition to 
adopt was filed. Furthermore, Felan, the 
child's mother, and their child had a "fami-
ly" picture taken in late December 1985, 
1. Felan was subsequently divorced in August 1982. 
just one month before the child's mother 
secretly consented to the child's adoption 
by the petitioners. 
The trial judge found Felan had not pro-
vided his child with adequate financial sup-
port Although at trial Felan produced 
cancelled checks made out to the child's 
mother totaling over $2,500, he never made 
regular child support payments. The 
child's mother never filed an action to en-
force Felan's legal obligation to support 
the child. Felan did buy the child a bicycle 
and other items during the child's visits 
with him. 
The mother underwent a mastectomy in 
May 1985. As a result of the mother's 
health, the petitioners began tending the 
child in August 1985. Further cancer was 
discovered in September 1985. The peti-
tioners took physical custody of the child in 
January 1986. When the petitioners had 
custody, Felan's requests to see his child 
were often refused. When the petitioners 
learned the mother was terminally ill, they 
asked to adopt the child and the mother 
consented. On January 7, 1986, the peti-
tioners filed a verified petition to adopt the 
child. Shortly thereafter, the mother filed 
her consent Felan did not know of the 
mother's intention to relinquish the child 
for adoption nor of petitioners' desire to 
adopt his child until after the petition for 
adoption had been filed and after the 
child's mother's death.2 Felan filed his ac-
knowledgment of paternity the day after 
he learned of the petition for adoption. 
Felan insists the child's mother led him to 
believe he would be allowed to rear the 
child upon her death. 
On September 17,1986, Felan applied for 
a military identification card for the child, 
which entitles the child to military benefits 
such as commissary privileges, dental, 
health, and death benefits. Felan's em-
ployment records identify the child as one 
2. The trial court found that Felan was unaware 
of the peution for adoption or the mother's 
consent thereto: 
[Felan] was unaware of and ignorant of the 
fact that a Petition for Adoption had been 
Bled by the petitioners and [that the child's 
mother] had given her consent to said adop-
of his beneficiaries. The child is currently 
covered by Felan's medical insurance. The 
trial court specifically found that Felan sat-
isfied the requirements delineated in sec-
tion 78-30-12, Utah's acknowledgment 
statute: 
[Felan] by his actions has acknowledged 
that he is the natural father of [the child] 
and has acknowledged his paternity by 
residing with [the child's mother] and the 
child for extended periods of time and by 
allowing his name to be placed on the 
birth and baptismal certificates of the 
child indicating that he is the father of 
[the child]; and by further acknowl-
edging to his own family and holding 
[the child] out to them as his child. 
The trial court also found Felan to be a 
fit and proper parent 
Each of the parties including petitioners 
and [Felan] are found to be by the court 
fit and proper persons to have custody of 
and to adopt [the child]; however, the 
petitioners and [the child] have developed 
a psychological relationship and bond 
which seems to the court to transcend 
the relationship which existed between 
[Felan] and [the child]. 
Thus, after finding that Felan had 
adopted the child by acknowledgment, that 
he held her out as his child, that he lived 
with the child and the child's mother for 
extended periods of time, and that Felan 
was a fit and proper person to have custo-
dy of the child and had developed a rela-
tionship with the child, the court, neverthe-
less, permanently terminated Felan's pa-
rental rights and allowed petitioners to pro-
ceed with their petition for adoption. The 
court based its decision on Felan's failure 
to file a notice of paternity before the 
petitioners filed their petition for adoption, 
and because the court believed such place-
ment would be in the "best interests" of 
the child.8 
tion. He did not become aware of those facts 
until after the death of [the child's mother]. 
3, We are also troubled by the trial court's treat-
ment of Felan, the child's natural father, 
throughout this procedurally protracted case. 
Felan, upon learning of the pending adoption 
proceedings, immediately filed an objection to 
T.R.F. v. FELAN Utah 909 
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I. term used in the statute was used advised-
ly." Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 
(Utah Ct App.1987). Therefore, we inter-
pret and apply the statute in accordance 
with its literal wording unless it is unrea-
sonably confused or inoperable. Id. 
It is presumed the Legislature intends to 
achieve a consistent body of law. 1A C. 
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construc-
tion § 23.09, at 332 (4th ed. 1985). Thus, 
statutes relating to the same subject mat-
ter "should be construed with reference to 
each other and harmonized, if possible," so 
that effect is given to every provision of 
the statutory scheme. Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). 
Utah's acknowledgment statute, codified 
at Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (1987), pro-
vides, with our emphasis added: 
The father of an illegitimate child, by 
publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of 
his wife, if he is married, into his family, 
and otherwise treating it as if it were a 
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as 
such, and such child is thereupon 
deemed for all purposes legitimate 
from the time of its birth. The fore-
going provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The pivotal question presented to this 
court concerns the proper interpretation of 
two statutes, namely the acknowledgment 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (1987), 
and the paternity statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7&-30-4 (1987). This is a question of law 
and, therefore, we apply a correction-of-er-
ror standard with no particular deference 
accorded the trial court's construction. 
Traylor Bros., Inc/Frunin-Colnon v. 
Overton, 736 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). However, on appeal, we will not 
disturb the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are "clearly erroneous." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a). The "clearly erroneous" 
standard, established by Rule 52(a), re-
quires "that if the findings . . . are against 
t i e clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings . . . will be set aside." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). The Utah Supreme Court, quoting 
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
And Procedure § 2585 (1971), stated: 
The appellate court . . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The 
mere fact that on the same evidence the 
appellate court might have reached a dif-
ferent result does not justify it in setting 
the findings aside. It may regard a find-
ing as clearly erroneous only i / the find-
ing is without adequate evidentiary sup-
port or induced by an erroneous view of 
the law. 
Id. at 193 (emphasis added). 
II. 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The cardinal rule in interpreting legisla-
tive enactments is "to assume that each 
the petition for adoption. Fclan sought an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine permanent custo-
dy and to determine visitation privileges with 
his child while this case was pending. The trial 
court denied each of Felan's requests. Felan 
appealed this disposition to the Utah Supreme 
Court. On November 3, 1986, the supreme 
court granted Felan's request and remanded the 
case for a "hearing on the law and the facts." 
This evidentiary hearing was held on February 
5, 1987, and was continued, per the parties' 
[1] In order to legitimate a child, the 
acknowledgment statute requires an unwed 
father to fulfill the following requirements: 
"(1) public acknowledgment by the father, 
(2) receipt of the child into the father's 
family and (3) treatment of the child as 
legitimate." Slade v. Dennis^ 594 P.2d 
898, 900 (Utah 1979). Utah's acknowledg-
ment statute and similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions "have historically been given 
liberal construction because of the law's 
stipulation, on May 12 and 13, 1987. While this 
litigation was pending, the trial court continued 
to refuse Felan visitation with his child even 
though he had exercised visitation privileges 
with his child the child's entire life. This denial 
is problematic since the court had yet to decide 
who would have permanent custody of the child 
and it would seem in the child's best interests to 
maintain a relationship with her natural father 
until his parental rights were finally deter-
mined. 
910 Utah 760 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
strong policy in favor of legitimation." Id 
at 899. 
Courts in other jurisdictions, in interpret-
ing statutes similar to [s]ection 78-30-12, 
have generally given liberal construction 
to these statutes in finding that the fa-
ther has received the child into his fami-
ly. It has generally been held that a 
father can satisfy the receiving require-
ment by accepting the child into his home 
for occasional brief visits. Further, 
some courts have not been insistent that 
the child actually be physically present in 
the father's home. The receiving re-
quirement has also been met where the 
father temporarily resides with the moth-
er and child, even for a very brief period. 
A father's custom of visiting the child at 
the mother's home has also been deemed 
sufficient 
Id at 900 (citations omitted). 
[2] Based upon the foregoing authority, 
the trial court was justified in finding that 
Felan had acknowledged his child and 
thereby legitimated the child pursuant to 
the acknowledgment statute before the pe-
tition for adoption was filed. Felan re-
ceived the child into his home for brief 
visits and on occasion his child would spend 
the night Felan temporarily resided with 
the child and the child's mother. When 
possible, Felan also visited the child at the 
child's mother's home. Felan took the 
child to Texas to meet his family. He held 
the child out to the public and to his family 
as his own. 
[3] By its express wording, the ac-
knowledgment statute provides the child is 
adopted and deemed legitimate from birth 
if the putative father has met the enumer-
ated statutory requirements. Thus, any 
filing of a petition for adoption after an 
unwed father has met the statutory re-
quirements, and with only the natural 
mother's consent, is a legal nullity. The 
father's consent is also required. To un-
derscore this intention, the Legislature ex-
pressly states in the acknowledgment stat-
ute "that the other provisions of this chap-
ter," i.e., the paternity statute, "do not 
apply to such an adoption." 
[4] The trial court, however, held that 
in order to maintain his parental rights 
established by compliance with the express 
terms of the acknowledgment statute, Fel-
an must, in addition to the enumerated 
requirements, file a notice of paternity. 
We do not read the statutory scheme as 
mandating such a requirement Rather, 
we harmonize the acknowledgment and pa-
ternity statutes by applying each according 
to its own wording and in the factual con-
text each was intended to apply. 
The relevant provision of the paternity 
statute, codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3Xb) (1987), provides in part: 
The notice may be registered prior to the 
birth of the child but must be registered 
prior to the date the illegitimate child is 
relinquished or placed with an agency 
licensed to provide adoption services or 
prior to the filing of a petition by a 
person with whom the mother has placed 
the child for adoption. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
interplay between the acknowledgment 
statute and the paternity statute in Ellis v. 
Social Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 
1250 (Utah 1980). In Ellis, the putative 
father claimed that by notifying the adop-
tion agency of his paternity, by filing a 
notice of paternity, and by filing his writ of 
habeus corpus after the petition for adop-
tion had been filed, he publicly acknowl-
edged and thereby legitimated his child 
within the meaning of the acknowledgment 
statute. In Ellis, the Utah Supreme Court 
held the putative father had not acted time 
ly in filing his notice of paternity. Ellis, 
615 P.2d at 1254. 
Ellis is factually distinguishable from 
the instant case as the acts claimed by the 
putative father in Ellis were not sufficient 
to satisfy the enumerated conditions in the 
acknowledgment statute. Furthermore, 
the language relied on by petitioners to 
support their position that the paternity 
statute has been grafted onto the acknowl-
edgment statute must be interpreted in 
light of those facts. The pivotal factual 
distinction between Ellis and this case is 
the timing of the putative father's acts, 
T.R.F. v. FELAN 
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Le., whether the father's acts satisfying the tion for adoption in 
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acknowledgment statute occurred before or 
after a petition for adoption has been filed. 
It is this distinction which allows Ellis to 
be read as harmonizing the acknowledg-
ment and the paternity statutes. 
The troublesome language of Ellis is as 
follows: 
In State in Interest of M [25 Utah 2d 
101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970)], this Court 
upheld the express provisions of the [ac-
knowledgment] statute and ruled that 
the putative father's right to custody of 
his illegitimate child is superior to all 
others, except the child's mother. How-
ever, in 1975, the legislature enacted a 
statute which effectively limited the time 
in which the putative father may assert 
those rights [the rights to legitimate the 
child under the acknowledgment statute] 
where the mother has relinquished her 
rights to the child. 
Therefore, whenever the natural mother 
relinquishes custody of the child either to 
an agency or to an individual for pur-
poses of adoption, in order to protect his 
rights under [the acknowledgment stat-
ute], the putative father must file a no-
tice of paternity with the Bureau. 
Where he fails timely to act [i.e., previ-
ously legitimate the child under the ac-
knowledgment statute, or file notice of 
paternity before the filing of the petition 
for adoption], he 'shall be barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any 
action to establish his paternity of the 
child.' 
Id. at 1253-54 (footnotes omitted). The 
supreme court concluded that the putative 
father's acts were not timely because he 
had not complied with either the paternity 
statute or the acknowledgment statute be-
fore the petition for adoption was filed. 
Every act the putative father claimed was 
sufficient to legitimate or acknowledge his 
child was done after the petition for adop-
tion had been filed. 
The language of Ellis need not be read, 
and indeed cannot constitutionally be read, 
to require a putative father to file a notice 
of paternity prior to the filing of the peti-
a case such as this 
where the putative father has previously 
acknowledged the child within the meaning 
of the acknowledgment statute. To read 
Ellis to the contrary contradicts the ex-
press language of the acknowledgment 
statute, which states that other sections of 
the chapter, i.e., the paternity statute, do 
not apply to acknowledgment adoptions 
and that the child is deemed legitimate 
from birth. 
Furthermore, to interpret the interplay 
between the acknowledgment statute and 
the paternity statute otherwise would be 
unconstitutional, as admitted by the su-
preme court in Ellis where the court 
states: 
In [Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
99 S.Ct 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ] the 
unwed father appealed from decisions of 
the New York state courts which allowed 
his children to be adopted by their natu-
ral mother and her present husband 
without his consent and against his 
wishes. The natural father had previ-
ously resided with the mother and had 
contributed to the children's support 
for a number of years, appeared as the 
father on their birth certificates, and 
maintained consistent contact with the 
children after separating from the 
mother. The United States Supreme 
Court held that under such circum-
stances, the permitting of unwed moth-
ers, but not unwed fathers, to veto 
adoption of a child by withholding con-
sent violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The problem present in Caban is obviat-
ed in this jurisdiction by the provisions of 
[the acknowledgment statute] 
Where the father of an illegitimate 
child complies with the provisions of 
that statute, his rights with respect to 
the child are as though the child was 
born legitimate. 
Id. at 1255 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
In the instant case, where the trial court 
specifically found that Felan, the unwed 
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father, had previously taken affirmative 
steps which satisfied the requirements of 
the acknowledgment statute, thereby legiti-
mating his child before the mother relin-
quished the child and before the petition for 
adoption had been filed, our supreme court 
cautions that the unwed father's failure to 
file a notice of paternity is not fatal 
There is no basis for the trial court's 
conclusion that Felan's failure to file a 
notice of paternity before petitioners filed 
their petition for adoption was sufficient to 
terminate his parental rights after he had 
already legitimated his child by acknowl-
edgment The acknowledgment statute 
and the paternity statute can be harmon-
ized to allow both to operate independently 
in the appropriate factual contexts. Where 
the acts which satisfy the requirements of 
the acknowledgment statute have not been 
undertaken prior to the relinquishment of 
the child or prior to the filing of the peti-
tion for adoption, then the putative father's 
failure to file a notice of paternity does 
defeat the father's right to claim the child. 
However, if the acts satisfying the ac-
knowledgment statute are accomplished 
prior to the mother's relinquishment or pri-
or to the filing of the petition for adoption, 
then the paternity statute is not applicable 
because the child is deemed legitimate from 
birth under the acknowledgment statute. 
The paternity statute is intended to apply 
to illegitimate children. This protects both 
the unwed father's constitutional rights 
and the important public policy of allowing 
speedy adoption of infants. 
III. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Our construction of the interplay be-
tween the acknowledgment statute and the 
paternity statute allows the statutory 
scheme to pass constitutional muster. An 
unwed father's constitutional rights to his 
child are a function of his relationship with 
his child. Our supreme court, relying on 
decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court, e.g.t Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S.Ct 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 
549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), has attempted 
to articulate the scale of protection accord-
ed unwed fathers by stating that 
[P]arents in different circumstances are 
apparently entitled to different degrees 
of protection for their parental rights. 
Parental rights are at their apex for par-
ents who are married. Some variation 
exists among unwed fathers. While 
those who have fulfilled a parental role 
over a considerable period of time are 
entitled to a high degree of protection, 
unwed fathers whose relationships to 
their children are merely biological or 
very attenuated may, in some circum-
stances, be deprived of their parental 
status merely on the basis of the finding 
of the "best interest" of the child. 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374-75 (Utah 
1982) (citations omitted). See Wells v. 
Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 203 (Utah 1984). 
The Supreme Court initially formulated a 
definition of the protected relationship in 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct 
2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), wherein the 
Court stated: 
When an unwed father demonstrates a 
full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by 'comfxng] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child,' 
his interest in personal contact with 
his child acquires substantial protec-
tion under the Due Process Clause 
But the mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent constitu-
tional protection. 
Id. at 261, 103 S.Ct at 2993 (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). The issue then be-
comes whether the acts and circumstances 
are sufficient to conclude that the father 
has "come forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child." 
We can best understand where Felan fits 
in the spectrum of constitutional protection 
by analyzing the facts of each relevant 
United States Supreme Court case and 
comparing them with those presented here. 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 
S.Ct 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), took place 
in Georgia. At the time, Georgia, like 
Utah, had a statute which allowed an 
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unwed father to legitimate his child. Un-
like Felan, the father in Quilloin had failed 
to comply with Georgia's statutory require-
ments to legitimate his ek en-year-old 
child prior to the stepfather r.iing a peti-
tion for adoption. The chiiu had been in 
the mother's complete control for her en-
tire life. The child's natural parents never 
lived together with the child. The natural 
father never had the child stay with him 
and never assumed any significant respon-
sibility in rearing the child. The natural 
father never sought custody or visitation 
but merely wished to block the stepfather's 
petition for adoption and thus the legal 
formation of an already physically existing 
family unit The Court emphasized the 
fact that any relationship between the nat-
ural father and child was tenuous, espe-
cially when weighed against the counter-
vailing interests of the existing family unit 
On these facts, the 'Court concluded the 
natural father did not have a "substantial 
relationship" with the child and allowed the 
natural father's parental rights to be termi-
nated using a "best interests" standard. 
In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
99 S.Ct 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), the 
mother of children bora out of wedlock and 
her present husband sought to adopt the 
children. The children's natural father ob-
jected to the petition for adoption and coun-
ter petitioned for adoption. The Supreme 
Court held that the New York Domestic 
Relations Act's gender-based classification 
violated the equal protection clause where 
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, 
was permitted to block the adoption of her 
child by withholding consent The Court 
distinguished those cases where there was 
a "substantial parental relationship" and 
those cases where there was a mere biolog-
ical relationship. 
The New York Court of Appeals in In re 
Malpica-Orsini, supra, [36 N.Y.2d 568, 
370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 331 N.E.2d 486 
(1975) ], suggested that the requiring of 
unmarried fathers' consent for adoption 
would pose a strong impediment for 
adoption because often it is impossible to 
locate unwed fathers when adoption pro-
ceedings are brought, whereas mothers 
are more likely to remain with their chil-
* (UuhApp. I96S) 
dren. Even if the special difficulties at-
tendant upon locating and identifying 
unwed fathers at birth would justify a 
legislative distinction between mothers 
and fathers of newborns, these difficul-
ties need not persist past infancy. 
When the adoption of an older child is 
sought, the State's interest in proceeding 
with adoption cases can be protected by 
means that do not draw such an inflexi-
ble gender-based distinction as that made 
in [New York's statute]. In those cases 
where the father never has come for-
ward to participate in the rearing of his 
child, nothing in the Equal Protection 
Clause precludes the State from with-
holding from him the privilege of vetoing 
the adoption of that child But in 
cases such as this, where the father has 
established a substantial relationship 
with the child and had admitted his 
paternity, a State should have no diffi-
culty in identifying the father even of 
children born out of wedlock. 
IcL at 392-93, 99 S.Ct at 1768-69 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 
S.Ct 2985, 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983), the puta-
tive father never supported and indeed had 
rarely seen his two-year-old child before 
the adoption. The father never lived with 
the child. The mother married eight 
months after the child's birth. Her new 
husband sought to adopt the child. The 
Court emphasized that the liberal New 
York acknowledgment statute provided an 
unwed father several means to establish 
his parenthood: the father could file with 
the state registry; the father could be iden-
tified on the child's birth certificate; or the 
father could live openly with the child and 
hold himself out as the child's father. The 
father claimed that under the due process 
and the equal protection clauses he was 
absolutely entitled to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before the child could be 
adopted. The Supreme Court disagreed, 
ruling that because the putative father 
failed to comply with the acknowledgment 
statute and had not established a "substan-
tial relationship" with the child, the failure 
to give him notice of the pending adoption 
T.R.F. v, 
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have a relationship with the child and to be 
a fit and proper parent In 1er to consti-
tutionally terminate Felan s ^ ental rights 
and allow the petitioners to proceed with 
their plans to adopt the child, the trial 
court would have had to determine Felan 
was unfit, or that he had abandoned, or 
that he substantially neglected his child. It 
did not As previously pointed out the 
trial court's result is not only at odds with 
Utah's statutory scheme applying to unwed 
fathers, but also unconstitutional, as Felan 
had established a "substantial relationship" 
with the child which merits constitutional 
protection. 
We concede that stability in child place-
ment should be a paramount value. How-
ever, "it cannot be the sole yardstick by 
which the legality of a particular custodial 
arrangement is judged. Such a standard 
would reward those who obtain custody, 
whether lawfully or otherwise, and main-
tain it during any ensuing (and protracted) 
litigation." In re Adoption of Halloway, 
732 P.2d 962, 971-72 (Utah 1986). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the legal question present-
ed to this court concerns the proper inter-
pretation of the statutory scheme applying 
to putative fathers with respect to the ter-
mination of their parental rights. We do 
not find the acknowledgment and paternity 
statutes inconsistent but rather believe 
they operate independently in appropriate 
factual contexts. We interpret the statutes 
as follows: when the unwed father ac-
knowledges his child, within the meaning 
5. Even if the acknowledgment statute is con-
strued as requiring the natural father, in addi-
tion to those requirements expressly delineated, 
to file a notice of paternity m order to legit-
imate his child, then it was "impossible" for 
Felan to file the notice of paternity under the 
facts presented See In re Adoption of Baby Boy 
Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986), In re of 
K.B.E <* T.M.E, 740 ?2d 292, 297 (Utah Ct 
App.1987). Felan was led to believe there was 
no reason to protect his parental rights by filing 
a notice of paternity. On the contrary, every-
one concerned, i.e., the petitioners and the 
child's mother, knew of his interest in the child. 
Indeed, according to Felan, the child's mother 
represented that he would get custody of the 
FELAN Utah 915 
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of the acknowledgment statute, prior to the 
mother's relinquishment of the child or pri-
or to the filing of the petition for adoption, 
then the father need not comply with the 
requirements of the paternity statute. 
However, if the claimed acts of acknowl-
edgment occur after the mother's relin-
quishment or after the petition for adoption 
has been filed, then the paternity statute 
governs,6 Where a parent has fulfilled pa-
rental obligations over a period of time, 
then the parent's parental rights are enti-
tled to a high degree of protection. Wells, 
681 P.2d at 203. There is no public policy 
favoring the termination of an unwed fa-
ther's parental rights where the father has 
had a long-standing relationship with the 
child, is determined to be a fit parent, and 
where those seeking to adopt the child are 
strangers who have been deceptive in their 
adoption plans. By contrast, where the 
child is a newborn different policy consider-
ations come into play. Utah's paternity 
statute applies to newborns who, by virtue 
of their age, cannot possibly have any rela-
tionship or attachment to their fathers Id 
In addition, there is a strong public policy 
favoring adoption of newborns. 
Despite the foregoing discussion, we 
agree with the tnal court that it may not 
be in the child's best interest to award 
Felan the right to rear the child. We have 
no doubt that the petitioners are and would 
continue to be appropriate parents. How-
ever, as we have noted, this case does not 
turn on what is in the child's "best inter-
est" Parents have a constitutional right 
to rear their children. We could agree with 
the result reached by the tnal court if it 
child upon her death knowing Felan intended to 
rear the child The petitioners never told Felan 
of their desire to adopt the child until after the 
petition for adoption was filed and after the 
mother's death Under the circumstances of 
this case, as in Baby Boy Doe, this was not 
"either a usual case or [one] that notice may be 
implied." Baby Boy Doe, 717 ?2d at 691. 
Therefore, Felan "has successful!} shown 'that 
the termination of his parental rights was con-
trary to basic notions of due process, that he 
came forward within a reasonable time after the 
baby's birth, [such that] he should be deemed to 
have complied with the statute.'" Id. (quoting 
Ellis, 615 ?2d at 1256). 
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proceedings did not deny him due process 
or equal protection. The Court reasoned 
that the putative father could have guaran-
teed himself notice of the adoption proceed-
ings by complying with the provisions of 
the acknowledgment statute. Id. at 265-
66, 103 S.Ct at 2995-96. The Court found 
that the acknowledgment statute adequate-
ly protected the putative father's inchoate 
interest in establishing a relationship with 
his child and, thus, found no merit to his 
claim that his constitutional rights were 
offended. Id. at 265, 103 S.Ct at 2995. 
Applying the foregoing authority to this 
case compels the conclusion that Felan has 
developed a "substantial relationship" with 
his child which merits constitutional protec-
tion. The facts in Quilloin are clearly 
distinguishable from those in this case. 
Here, Felan did not sit on his rights for 
eleven years of his child's life. Rather, he 
complied with the requirements of Utah's 
acknowledgment statute by publicly ac-
knowledging the child and holding the child 
out as his own from the child's birth. He 
was identified as the child's father on the 
child's birth certificate and baptismal 
record. He and the child's mother estab-
lished a home together after the child's 
birth. He continued to visit the child even 
after the parties' separation and he contrib-
uted to the support of the child. Unlike 
the natural father in Quilloin, he seeks 
actual and legal custody of his child. 
The facts of Caban are more similar to 
those presented here. In this case, Felan, 
like the father in Caban, was identified on 
his child's birth certificate, the child is old-
er, the natural parents and the child previ-
ously lived together, and Felan stayed in 
contact with the child despite Felan's sepa-
ration from the child's mother. Indeed, the 
facts presented here are even more compel-
ling than those in Caban because Caban 
involved an adoption by the stepparents; 
here, the adoption involves third parties 
unrelated in any manner to either Felan or 
the child. 
4. If "regular support* is a requirement that must 
be demonstrated in order to establish that a 
father has parental rights, then many divorced 
fathers who are not current in their support 
Finally, in comparing Lehr, unlike the 
putative father there, Felan would have 
qualified under the acknowledgment stat-
ute because Felan was named on the child's 
birth certificate, Felan lived openly with 
the child's mother, and Felan held himself 
out as the child's father. 
Furthermore, although the cases discuss 
whether the father contributed to the sup-
port of the child, there is no articulated 
requirement that the father "regularly sup-
port" the child.4 
The facts in the record and the findings 
of the trial court based on those facts clear-
ly indicate Felan established the requisite 
"substantial relationship" with his child pri-
or to the filing of the petition for adoption. 
Because Felan had a "substantial relation-
ship" with the child, the termination of his 
parental rights by application of the pater-
nity statute or by a utilization of the "best 
interests" standard would violate his due 
process liberties. 
[5] Parental rights cannot be terminat-
ed by merely applying the "best interests" 
of the child standard but, rather, there 
must be a showing of the parent's unfit-
ness, abandonment, or substantial neglect 
In re J.R, 648 P.2d at 1375. 
[T]he right of a parent not to be deprived 
of parental rights without such a show-
ing is so fundamental to our society and 
so basic to our constitutional order . . . 
that it ranks among those rights referred 
to in Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the Ninth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution as being re-
tained by the people. 
This recognition of due process and 
retained rights of parents promotes val-
ues essential to the preservation of hu-
man freedom and dignity and to the per-
petuation of our democratic society. 
Id. at 1375-76. 
[6] In this case, the trial court deprived 
Felan of his parental rights based upon the 
"best interests" of the child, despite the 
fact that the trial court found Felan to 
obligations could be subject to having their pa-
rental rights terminated under a "best interest" 
of the child standard. 
had determined that Felan had acknowl-
edged the child but that he was not a fit 
and proper parent but had neglected or 
subsequently abandoned the child. Under 
these circumstances, the termination of 
Felan's parental rights would not be uncon-
stitutional. 
We, therefore, reverse and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.* 
We concede such a result may disrupt the 
child's stability. However, as previously 
discussed, the child's stability must be con-
sidered in relationship to the constitutional 
rights of Felan. 
GARFF and DAVIDSON, JJ., concur. 
In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
No. 870415-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept 1, 1988. 
Prospective adoptive parents appealed 
from order of Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., allow-
ing natural mother of infant to revoke her 
consent to adoption and ordering custody 
of infant returned to natural mother. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that 
evidence was insufficient to establish any 
permissible ground for withdrawal of con-
sent 
Judgment vacated. 
1. Adoption <3»15 
Appellate court's review of decision al-
lowing natural mother to revoke her con-
sent to adoption was de novo; where trial 
6. We point out that this was an adoption pro-
ceeding governed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-
4, -5 (1987), and not an action for custody. See 
court's decision was rendered solely on ba-
sis of documentary evidence. 
2. Adoption «»7.8(1) 
Adoption consent of natural parent 
given before district judge gives rise to 
presumption of regularity that can be over-
come only by showing of duress, undue 
influence, misrepresentation, deception, or 
other grounds justifying release from any 
contract U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8. 
3. Adoption <s=>7.8(l) 
Natural mother's claim that she be-
lieved she had six-month period in which to 
revoke her consent to adoption did not 
show misrepresentation as required to 
overcome presumption of regularity of con-
sent executed before and accepted by a 
judge. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8. 
4. Appeal and Error «=»837(1) 
Counsel's comments and character-
izations of the "facts" at oral argument on 
motion were not evidence properly con-
sidered by appellate court 
5. Adoption <s=>7.8(3) 
In motion to set aside adoption consent 
based on misunderstanding, weight of evi-
dence would have supported validity of 
adoption consent even if natural mother 
had asserted that she was misled by trial 
judge's isolated comment concerning finali-
ty of adoption proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 78-
30-8. 
6. Adoption <s»7.5 
Status of adoption consent as knowing 
and voluntary was not effected by the fact 
that adult natural mother chose not to con-
sult with members of her own family con-
cerning adoption until after execution of 
consent U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8. 
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